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A CORPORATE LAW RATIONALE  
FOR REPARATIONS 
SUSAN S. KUO* 
BENJAMIN MEANS** 
Abstract: Should the United States pay reparations to African Americans? A ma-
jority of Americans object, arguing that they are not personally responsible for 
slavery or Jim Crow laws. Their objection is rooted in the principle of ethical in-
dividualism, which holds that people can be blamed only for their own actions. 
This Article contends that the ethical-individualism objection to reparations is 
misplaced because it assumes that what matters is the culpability of each citizen. 
This Article argues that like a corporation, the United States is a legal person. 
Consequently, seeking reparations from the United States does not turn on the 
guilt of its citizens any more than prosecuting a corporation turns on the guilt of 
its shareholders. This Article further contends that corporate law contains re-
sources for evaluating reparations on the merits. In particular, although this Arti-
cle assumes that legal claims against the United States are not justiciable, it uses 
the Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Guidelines to develop a moral 
case for paying reparations. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 19, 2019, Congress held hearings on H.R. 40, a bill that would 
establish a “Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for Afri-
can-Americans.”1 After years of neglect, the topic of reparations has received 
renewed attention as a way for the nation to atone for slavery, Jim Crow laws, 
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 1 H.R. 40—Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, 
CONGRESS.GOV (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40 [https://
perma.cc/23UY-9S78]. Similar bills have been introduced in Congress every year since 1989 and 
have stalled in committee. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, At Historic Hearing, House Panel Explores Rep-
arations, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/us/politics/slavery-
reparations-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/PP8F-6Q8M]. The June 19, 2019 hearings were the first 
ones held in more than a decade. See Richard Gonzales, Congressional Hearing on Slavery Repara-
tions Set for Wednesday, NPR (June 18, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/733880321/
congressional-hearing-on-slavery-reparations-set-for-wednesday [https://perma.cc/BP3X-YC76]. 
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and other forms of racial oppression.2 According to one scholar, “We have not 
had a conversation about reparations on this scale or level since the Recon-
struction Era.”3 The conversation is long overdue. 
Notwithstanding the increased visibility of reparations arguments, a ma-
jority of Americans oppose any form of reparations.4 Among conservatives, 
support is practically nonexistent.5 Invoking the principle of ethical individual-
ism, opponents ask, “Why should I pay for something I didn’t do?”6 Those 
who were directly responsible, the slaveowners of previous centuries, are 
dead.7 Consequently, ethical individualism allows Americans to express their 
regret for past wrongs without acknowledging any obligation to pay for them. 
For example, a congressional resolution both apologized “on behalf of the 
people of the United States, for the wrongs committed against [African Ameri-
cans] and their ancestors who suffered under slavery and Jim Crow laws” and 
added a prominent disclaimer that “[n]othing in this resolution . . . authorizes 
or supports any claim against the United States.”8 
This Article argues that the ethical-individualism objection is misplaced, 
not because the underlying principle is wrong or unimportant, but because the 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Perhaps galvanized by Ta-Nehisi Coates’s 2014 story, The Case for Reparations, the issue of 
reparations has moved from the margins of the nation’s public discourse on race. Ta-Nehisi Coates, 
The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/?gclid=CjwKCAiAlNf-BRB_EiwA2osbxU3KXEqk
4bHqL7AtzZQLGybRD4aup1oHPqIacAephpfsXsTpPZ-IthoCL4QQAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/
CVY9-7GQJ]; see Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, How Ta-Nehisi Coates Turned Reparations from a 
Joke into a Policy Objective, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/03/20/how-ta-nehisi-coates-turned-reparations-punchline-into-policy-objective/ [https://
perma.cc/WH5B-9WZF]. 
 3 Stolberg, supra note 1 (quoting Professor William A. Darity, Jr.). 
 4 According to a recent poll, 67% of Americans oppose reparations that involve cash payments to 
African Americans descended from slaves. Mohamed Younis, As Redress for Slavery, Americans Op-
pose Cash Payments, GALLUP (July 29, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/261722/redress-slavery-
americans-oppose-cash-reparations.aspx [https://perma.cc/BFN9-AG57]. The same pool found that 
among non-Hispanic whites, 81% oppose the idea of reparation payments. See id. 
 5 Although Democrats are almost evenly split, more than 90% of Republicans are against repara-
tions. See id. This Article follows Professor Ariela Gross’s use of “the terms ‘conservative’ and ‘liber-
al’ in their conventional contemporary political senses.” Ariela Gross, When Is the Time of Slavery? 
The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political Argument, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 284 
(2008). 
 6 See John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND THE 
RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 180, 191 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003); David C. Gray, A 
No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (2010) (At bottom, “these objections are nothing more than the familiar 
‘I didn’t do it. It wasn’t me.’”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiv-
ing the Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL. 183, 184 (2006). 
 7 See David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim 
Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2004) (arguing that “a reparations claim made today based solely 
on the wrongs of chattel slavery faces serious problems”). 
 8 S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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objection assumes that reparations must be rooted in the direct obligations of 
individual citizens. Yet, just as a corporation is distinct from its shareholders 
and responsible for its own wrongdoing, the United States is a legal person 
separate and apart from its citizens. Seeking reparations from the United States 
does not turn on the guilt of its citizens any more than prosecuting a corpora-
tion turns on the guilt of its shareholders.9 
By demonstrating corporate law’s relevance to the issue of U.S. repara-
tions, this Article makes a novel contribution to the literature. Although other 
commentators have identified the analogy between a corporation and a nation, 
they have limited their focus to the most obvious point of potential similarity: 
that corporations and nations are long lived.10 Missing from their analysis is an 
application of the corporate concept of legal personhood. Instead, they have 
largely assumed that the ethical-individualism objection must be satisfied with 
respect to each individual citizen.11 
Thus, while some reparations scholars offer a corporate law comparison 
to explain why claims for reparations based on past wrongs are not untimely, 
they look for other reasons to hold individual citizens accountable for those 
wrongs. For example, one scholar contends that even if a collective entity such 
as the United States is implicated in wrongdoing, the responsibility of any par-
ticular stakeholders will be unclear because “there is always a diversity of rela-
tionships between group members and abuses.”12 Another scholar argues that 
although the U.S. government might be understood in corporate terms, repara-
tions paid by citizens would need to be founded on some broader theory of col-
lective, societal responsibility.13 Similarly, two commentators distinguish ethi-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., Joshua C. Macey, What Corporate Veil?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2019) (re-
viewing ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2018)) (observing that “corporate criminal liability is inconsistent with the associations-of-
people view of the corporation and reflects the view that corporations are separate legal entities”). 
 10 See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 519 n.94 (2003) (suggesting “analogy” between reparations and 
“shareholders’ liability for a corporation’s actions”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seri-
ously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 723 
n.153 (2004) (stating that “ [a]n analogy to corporate identity may . . . be helpful . . . [because] [a] 
corporation retains the same identity from one day to the next, notwithstanding changeover in share-
holders or employees”); Lyons, supra note 7, at 1385 (“Institutions, such as corporations and political 
organizations, can be held accountable and are capable of existing for many generations.”). 
 11 For example, one scholar highlights the “simple fact that groups do not act; only individuals 
act.” David C. Gray, Extraordinary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. 55, 65 (2010); see also George P. 
Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 
YALE L.J. 1499, 1529 (2002) (“The problem is essentially one of attribution.”). 
 12 See Gray, supra note 11, at 65. 
 13 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 10, at 715 (stating that, unlike governments or corporations, “it may 
be questioned whether American ‘society’ is a collective entity to which any obligation may be as-
cribed”). 
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cal theories that explain when a “corporate body” can “have moral obligations” 
from the extreme form of “ethical collectivism” they assert is necessary to ac-
count for obligations held by “a more loosely defined group such as a na-
tion.”14 Such arguments replicate the ethical-individualism objection within the 
structure of the corporation, but they do not resolve it. 
This Article takes the corporate law analogy one crucial step further, con-
tending that what matters is not only the lifespan of the entity but its person-
hood. The United States is a legal person built according to a corporate model 
as set forth in the nation’s founding charter, the U.S. Constitution. Notably, the 
Founders used corporate law as their template for precisely this purpose—to 
establish a nation distinct from the majoritarian preferences of the people taken 
as a whole.15 Like a corporation, the nation can hold property, enter contracts, 
and incur legal obligations.16 A corporation’s choices affect the value of the 
shareholders’ investments regardless of whether they agree with those choices 
or are even aware of them. For the same reason, when the United States acts, the 
consequences of those actions affect citizens who, in their capacity as taxpayers, 
are ultimately responsible for funding the government. To argue about whether 
individual citizens owe reparations is to miss the point. 
Having used corporate law principles to rebut the ethical-individualism 
objection to U.S. reparations, this Article further contends that corporate law 
contains resources for evaluating reparations on the merits. In particular, this 
Article relies upon the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Guidelines (Charging 
Guidelines) that U.S. attorneys consult when deciding whether to bring crimi-
nal charges against a corporation.17 Key factors include the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing, the timely acceptance of responsibility, the extent of restitution 
and remediation measures already undertaken, the likelihood that a prosecution 
of the corporation would disproportionately cause harm to shareholders, em-
                                                                                                                           
 14 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 698–99 (2003). 
 15 David Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation? The Corporate Origins of Modern 
Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 431 (2017) (“Corporate theory was used, first, to 
differentiate the people into two capacities—chartering sovereign and electing multitude—and then to 
exclude the former from the government by virtue of its act of chartering.”). 
 16 The argument does not require us to take sides in ongoing debates regarding the U.S. constitu-
tional rights of corporations because it is widely accepted that corporations act as persons when they 
engage with third parties and can be liable for wrongdoing. See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving 
Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1663 (arguing that the ability to own property, 
enter into contracts, and the like are “essential features necessary for corporations’ practical use”); see 
also discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
 17 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.000 (2021), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations [https://perma.cc/ETS4-L65A] (princi-
ples of federal prosecution of business organizations). 
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ployees, or other stakeholders, and the feasibility of bringing claims against the 
individuals whose actions form the basis for entity liability.18 
When applied to the United States and its treatment of African Americans, 
analysis of each of these factors weighs in favor of reparations. Notably, if a 
corporation authorized wrongdoing at the highest levels, failed to institute 
meaningful compliance procedures to ensure that the wrongdoing ceased and 
was not repeated, repeatedly denied or minimized the nature of its own wrong-
doing, and refused to take steps to remediate the harms it had caused, a prose-
cutor would be hard pressed not to bring charges.19 Although legal claims 
against the United States for reparations may not be justiciable in a court of 
law,20 reparations can be authorized through the political process. In that re-
gard, the Charging Guidelines are useful as a tool for assessing the nation’s 
ongoing responsibilities. As The New York Times recently observed when 
launching The 1619 Project, the United States was built upon slavery and has 
never engaged in an honest reckoning with its past.21 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I surveys arguments for repara-
tions, the objection that American taxpayers are not responsible for the sins of 
previous generations, and the standard responses to that objection.22 Part II 
contends that corporate law has direct explanatory power because the United 
States is a legal person modeled on corporate precedent, and that the protested 
innocence of individual citizens should have no bearing on whether the United 
States owes reparations.23 Part III uses the factors set forth in the DOJ’s Charg-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. § 9-28.300 (identifying “Factors to Be Considered”). 
 19 According to one scholar, when the U.S. Supreme Court addresses the historical record, it 
mostly dismisses slavery as an aberration inconsistent with the nation’s more permanent values rather 
than a wrong that needs to be addressed and overcome. See Justin Collings, The Supreme Court and 
the Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265, 270 (2019) (distinguishing “parenthetical” and “redemp-
tive” modes of analyses). 
 20 See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing a reparations 
action brought against the United States as non-justiciable); Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against 
Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (2004) (arguing that applicable statute of limitations 
would preclude successful reparations claims in court). 
 21 Jake Silverstein, Editor’s Note, The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 18, 2019, at 4, 4–5 
(“The goal of The 1619 Project, a major initiative from The New York Times that this issue of the 
magazine inaugurates, is to reframe American history by considering what it would mean to regard 
1619 [the year African slaves first arrived in the British colony of Virginia] as our nation’s birth 
year.”). Jake Silverstein concluded that “American history cannot be told truthfully without a clear 
vision of how inhuman and immoral the treatment of black Americans has been.” Id. at 5. In response 
to The 1619 Project, President Donald Trump threatened that schools that “teach this alternative nar-
rative of American history could lose federal funding.” Ronn Blitzer, Trump Warns Schools Teaching 
1619 Project ‘Will Not Be Funded,’ FOX NEWS (Sept. 6, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/
trump-warns-schools-teaching-1 [https://perma.cc/9SAZ-EKWX]. 
 22 See discussion infra Part I. 
 23 See discussion infra Part II. 
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ing Guidelines to support the case for reparations.24 To be clear, this Article 
takes no position on the merits of any particular reparations program.25 Rather, 
the corporate law framework this Article proposes clarifies why the United 
States is the relevant actor for purposes of reparations analysis and why the 
United States should recognize an unmet obligation. As for questions of design 
and implementation, we cannot know what form justice may take unless we 
are willing to seek it. 
I. REPARATIONS AND ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
Part I situates the Article’s argument by providing background context 
concerning reparations and ethical individualism. Section A defines the con-
cept of reparations and explains how U.S. reparations for African Americans fit 
within the ambit of reparations programs more generally.26 Section B examines 
the ethical-individualism objection—that it would be wrong to place a finan-
cial burden on taxpayers who have no direct responsibility for slavery, Jim 
Crow laws, or other injustices.27 Finally, Section C surveys a range of potential 
responses to ethical individualism.28 
A. Arguments for Reparations 
To pay reparations is to admit that a wrong was done and to seek to make 
it right.29 Reparation programs vary widely depending on the specific circum-
stances surrounding their deployment, but most have several features in com-
mon. First, reparations involve payments made “to a large group of claim-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See discussion infra Part III. 
 25 Similarly, H.R. 40, a bill, does not conclude that reparations are feasible and is limited to inves-
tigating the possibility. Alyssa Rosenberg, Opinion, Culture Change and Ta-Nehisi Coates’s ‘The 
Case for Reparations,’ WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-
four/wp/2014/05/22/culture-change-and-ta-nehisi-coatess-the-case-for-reparations/ [https://perma.cc/
US8P-BYG9]. Among other possibilities, reparations might “take the form of concrete benefits, such 
as cash payments, social welfare entitlements, or guaranteed access to education and employment.” 
Gray, supra note 6, at 1054 (footnote omitted). For an assessment of practical challenges that would 
need to be confronted, see generally Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of 
Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531 (2001) (reviewing RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA 
OWES TO BLACKS (2000)); see also Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
1319, 1320–21 (2004) (arguing in favor of reparations, but observing that “[g]iven the historic scope 
of the injustice slavery represents, the potential size of a fully ‘reparative’ transfer could be astronom-
ical”). 
 26 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 27 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 28 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 29 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 
1056 (2003) (identifying “the goals of reparations as acceptance, acknowledgment, and accounting”). 
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ants.”30 Second, it is characteristic of reparations that the conduct at issue was 
lawful at the time.31 Third, reparations programs are created mainly as a last 
resort when the victims have no other available remedy at law.32 Fourth, repa-
rations are typically meant to correct past injustices rather than as a form of 
social engineering.33 
Proposed U.S. reparations for African Americans fit each of those charac-
teristics. Even if restricted to African Americans who are descended from 
slaves, reparations would involve a very large number of claimants.34 Also, 
although the horrors of slavery were widely recognized during the colonial era, 
U.S. law authorized slavery. Furthermore, it appears that no independent 
mechanism exists at law for compensating African Americans.35 Finally, what-
ever value reparations might have for reducing societal inequality going for-
ward or for achieving racial reconciliation, they are generally defended as the 
repayment of a debt owed to African Americans.36 
U.S. reparations for slavery would not be without precedent. In 1946, 
Congress authorized payment to Native Americans for stolen land and other 
wrongs.37 Since then, the United States has paid reparations for the internment 
of Japanese Americans during World War II, for exposing people to radiation, 
and for conducting syphilis experiments on African Americans without their 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 691. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. (noting that typically “current law bars a compulsory remedy for the past wrong (by virtue 
of sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, or similar rules)”). 
 33 Id. (distinguishing “backward-looking grounds of corrective justice” from “forward-looking 
grounds such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing”). Contra Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American 
Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Ter-
ror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1335 (2003) (arguing for a broader vision of reparations that is “more 
than just compensation for past debts”). Professor Eric Yamamoto and his coauthors contend that 
reparations offer a “vehicle for groups in conflict to rebuild their relationships through attitudinal 
changes and institutional restructuring.” Id. 
 34 See Wesley Lowery, Which Black Americans Should Get Reparations?, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/which-americans-should-get-reparations/2019/09/
18/271cf744-cab1-11e9-a4f3-c081a126de70_story.html [https://perma.cc/Y7EM-6CPT]. 
 35 See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing a complaint brought 
against the United States for slavery and racial discrimination against African Americans). In 1995, in 
Cato v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[w]hile plaintiff 
may be justified in seeking redress for past and present injustices, it is not within the jurisdiction of 
this Court to grant the requested relief.” Id. at 1105 (quoting Armstrong, J.). 
 36 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in 
America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 282 (2003) (“At its most basic level, reparations seeks 
something more than token acknowledgment of the centuries of suffering of African Americans at the 
hands of the state and federal governments, corporations, and individuals during the three centuries of 
chattel slavery and Jim Crow.”). 
 37 See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in 
the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453, 468 (1994). 
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knowledge or consent.38 Reparations paid to the descendants of slaves would 
involve a greater number of claimants, a greater time span between injury and 
recovery, and, very likely, a significantly expanded financial commitment.39 In 
principle, though, the United States has already acknowledged the appropriate-
ness of paying reparations to account for past wrongs.40 
B. Ethical Individualism 
No one operating in good faith would contest the enormity of the wrongs 
committed against African Americans. Yet, the case for reparations requires 
more than the existence of a wrong. It is also necessary to find someone who 
we can ask to pay for the wrong and to ascertain what amount is owed and to 
whom it should be paid. Some commentators worry that the practical impedi-
ments to designing and implementing a reparations program are insurmountable, 
regardless of any theoretical merit.41 The most forceful objection to reparations, 
however, derives its strength from the principle of ethical individualism—that 
those who are innocent of a violation cannot be held responsible for it. 
If arguments for reparations assert the existence of a moral obligation, 
they must also establish a “relationship between the original wrongdoer and 
the possible payer of reparations.”42 Opponents of reparations for African 
Americans deny the existence of any such relationship and contend that those 
alive today cannot be held responsible for slavery, Jim Crow laws, or any other 
form of racial oppression.43 For example, then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell stated: “I don’t think reparations for something that happened 150 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Posner & Vermeuele, supra note 14, at 696 tbl.1. Although the payment to heirs of the 
African Americans included in the syphilis study settled a class action lawsuit, the United States “set-
tled for ‘unique reasons,’ namely that ‘the United States was rightfully and grievously embarrassed’ 
and that ‘it was in the best interest of the United States Government to close the last chapter of this 
sordid book as expeditiously and honorably as possible.’” Id. at 695 n.19 (quoting Pollard v. United 
States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 647, 649 (M.D. Ala. 1976)). 
 39 The value of labor stolen from African Americans through slavery has been calculated to 
amount to trillions of dollars. See James Marketti, Estimated Present Value of Income Diverted Dur-
ing Slavery, in THE WEALTH OF RACES: THE PRESENT VALUE OF BENEFITS FROM PAST INJUSTICES 
107, 107 (Richard F. America ed., 1990). 
 40 See Lyons, supra note 7, at 1385 (“[T]he United States government has accepted accountability 
for the Tuskegee syphilis experiment and the World War II internment of Japanese Americans, and it 
has paid reparations accordingly.”). 
 41 See Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND THE 
RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS, supra note 6, at 165, 170 (arguing that “as a matter of sheer prac-
ticality, reparations raises more concerns than it assuages”). 
 42 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 698. 
 43 See Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1181, 1202 (2004) (“[T]he type of argument that has gained the most attention—and is advanced most 
seriously against reparations—is that the people currently asked to pay had nothing to do with the 
injustices of the past.”). 
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years ago—for [which] none of us currently living are responsible—is a good 
idea.”44 Ethical individualism defines justice in terms of individual responsibility 
and argues that collective obligations are illegitimate.45 Put simply, if justice 
must always be assessed on an individual basis, then “groups don’t matter.”46 
Our legal system is largely committed to the principle of ethical individu-
alism.47 In “[t]he traditional common law paradigm of a legal claim, an indi-
vidual wrongfully harmed by the specific actions of another in the recent past 
[seeks] to recover demonstrable personal losses.”48 Thus, a basic goal of the 
tort system is that those who commit wrongs compensate their victims.49 To 
avoid imposing wider compensatory obligations, tort law requires a showing of 
causation so that it links the victim and wrongdoer appropriately.50 Class ac-
tion lawsuits are a partial exception because they involve claims brought on 
behalf of multiple plaintiffs,51 but they are permissible only when it would be 
impracticable to name each individual plaintiff and when all plaintiffs’ claims 
turn on common issues of law and fact.52 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Felicia Sonmez, McConnell Says He’s Against Reparations for Slavery: ‘It Would Be Pretty 
Hard to Figure Out Who to Compensate,’ WASH. POST (June 18, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/mcconnell-says-hes-against-reparations-for-slavery-it-would-be-pretty-hard-to-
figure-out-who-to-compensate/2019/06/18/9602330c-9205-11e9-b58a-a6a9afaa0e3e_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/C6XT-FS9X] (alteration in original) (quoting Sen. Majority Leader McConnell). 
 45 For example, one theorist uses ethical individualism to reject the “argument that affirmative 
action is justified because of the past oppression of black Americans by white Americans.” Jon Elster, 
Ethical Individualism and Presentism, 76 THE MONIST 333, 333 (1993). 
 46 Id.; see also Gray, supra note 6, at 1076 (asserting that there “is a conceptual error at the core 
of collective responsibility: groups do not act, only individuals act”). 
 47 For that reason, “[a] strong tradition in the United States holds that individuals are not blame-
worthy for acts over which they have no control.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 699. 
 48 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African Ameri-
can Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 508 (1998). Taken together, “[c]oncepts such as the time-bar, prox-
imate cause, and laches ensure that claims are fresh, capable of factual determination, and reasonably 
connected in time and space to the act of an individual wrongdoer.” Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 381 (1987) (foot-
notes omitted) (contending that “the sins of the past should not forever burden the innocent genera-
tions of the future”). 
 49 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 425 (1993) (“A judg-
ment of liability simultaneously affirms both the entitlement of the plaintiff and the obligation of the 
defendant.”). 
 50 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (evaluating issues of proximate 
causation); Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 674 (1968) (arguing that “in the 
standard case of responsibility for harm, there can be no liability without contributory fault”). 
 51 See Paul R. Dubinsky, Justice for the Collective: The Limits of the Human Rights Class Action, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1152, 1152 (2004) (“As against the U.S. legal system’s strong orientation toward 
individual rights rather than group rights, the class action is a countercurrent.”). 
 52 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). In 2011, in Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, the U.S. Supreme Court empha-
sized that the class action mechanism must, ultimately, resolve the individual claims of each partici-
pant. See 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) (“Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those 
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The ethical-individualism objection has rhetorical power because it forces 
proponents of reparations to “explain why nonwrongdoers—usually taxpayers 
or shareholders—should pay reparations.”53 By highlighting the financial bur-
dens to be imposed on putatively innocent taxpayers, opponents attack the moral 
impetus for reparations.54 Thus, it should not be surprising that “[c]ontemporary 
whites asked to contribute directly or through taxes protest that they have never 
owned slaves and were born generations after the practice was abolished.”55 
When reparations are framed as a matter of individual responsibility for past 
wrongs, many people will respond by asserting their innocence. 
Yet, the commonsense version of ethical individualism—“don’t blame 
me, I didn’t do it”—obscures conceptual difficulties that emerge when we at-
tempt to give a more formal account of how ethical individualism pertains to 
U.S. reparations. Significantly, the ethical-individualism objection appears to 
combine two related concerns: (1) that reparations would impose financial 
penalties on a wide swath of blameless individuals based on a theory of group 
responsibility; and (2) that the injuries to be remedied occurred long ago and 
are not the responsibility of those now living. 
Standing alone, stripped of its association with the idea that reparations 
are untimely, the ethical-individualism objection loses much of its luster. To 
insist that each individual’s responsibility must be assessed based on the indi-
vidual’s own choices is to endorse an absurd conclusion—that a nation, busi-
ness, or other collective organization can never incur responsibility when the 
ultimate financial consequences would be borne in part by individuals who are 
not themselves directly culpable. If that were the case, entities would act with 
practical impunity as long as some members were not involved in any particu-
lar endeavor.56 Apart from the smallest groups, most organizations use a cen-
                                                                                                                           
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for 
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”). 
 53 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 736. The analysis may include “prudential considera-
tions.” Id. 
 54 See, e.g., id. at 738 (“[O]ne cannot generally trace the benefits and harms of slavery down to 
particular individuals living today.”). 
 55 Gray, supra note 6, at 1046 (footnote omitted). The objection is further “amplified by the fact 
that the proposed beneficiaries were never themselves slaves.” Id. This Article’s focus is the objection 
as it pertains to those who would pay reparations rather than the beneficiaries who would receive 
payments. To the extent that race remains a salient marker of difference in contemporary society, it 
may be that the descendants of slavery should properly include all who society treats them as such. 
See Ogletree, supra note 36, at 314 (“The social construction of people of African descent in America 
depends not simply upon the fact of personal or familial slavery. Rather, racial difference has been 
mediated through the stigma of slavery and Jim Crow and contained in perceptions lasting through the 
present time.”). 
 56 More difficult philosophical questions regarding group responsibility arise when corporate 
liability is based upon the misconduct of rogue employees, especially if they are relatively low-level 
employees. United States corporate law ascribes responsibility to the entity, even for criminal viola-
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tral, managerial governance structure and their decisions rarely involve total 
consensus. 
Although the opposition to reparations for African Americans often 
stresses the passage of time, in theory ethical individualism would preclude 
reparations payments regardless of when the harms took place.57 In the case of 
slavery, collective liability would be permissible only if all members of society 
supported the institution.58 Of course, many Americans opposed slavery.59 
Thus, applying the principle of ethical individualism in its defense, a slave-
owning nation could deny responsibility for its actions by gesturing to the ex-
istence of the abolitionists it once scorned. 
In sum, the ethical-individualism objection to reparations turns out to be 
as much about the passage of time as it is about individual responsibility. Dis-
aggregating the question of individual responsibility from temporal considera-
tions reduces the intuitive appeal of ethical individualism and shifts much of 
the weight of the objection from an absolutist concern with collective respon-
sibility to a more ambiguous question about how groups make decisions. 
Moreover, time limits for the redress of wrongs are bound to appear arbitrary. 
How many citizens must still be alive for a nation to remain morally accounta-
ble for its wrongful actions? A majority? Some? A single person? As applied to 
the question of U.S. reparations, therefore, the ethical-individualism objection 
                                                                                                                           
tions, based on respondeat superior and some commentators have questioned whether a corporation 
can have the appropriate mental state. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for 
Imposing Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate 
Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983); V.S. 
Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 
B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999). The Founders established the United States as a slaveholding nation and 
many of its first Presidents, members of Congress, and federal judges were slaveowners. Therefore, 
concerns about respondeat superior as a basis for collective liability should have little application to 
the issue of reparations. 
 57 See Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 185 (“The opposition to Black reparations thus focuses on the 
temporal dislocation between slavery and the present, but the argument loses none of its force when 
applied to more recent injustices.”). Professor Amy Sepinwall notes that if this argument were correct, 
it would block reparations programs that have been implemented elsewhere for the benefit of victims 
of the Holocaust and “Korean ‘comfort women.’” Id. at 183 (quoting George Hicks, The Comfort 
Women Redress Movement, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES 
FOR HUMAN JUSTICE 113, 124 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999)). 
 58 Id. at 193 (“The individualist could assent to the claim about national liability only if every 
American wrongfully contributed to slavery.”). 
 59 Thus, Professor Sepinwall draws the logical conclusion: 
[I]f it would have been impermissible to hold the nation liable for making repair at the 
time that slavery ended, it would a fortiori be impermissible to hold the nation today to 
this duty, given that contemporary citizens would not even have had the opportunity to 
prevent or end slavery. 
Id. 
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appears to depend on an incompletely specified relationship between collective 
liability and the passage of time. 
C. Responses to Ethical Individualism 
Setting aside the threshold issue of whether ethical individualism is logi-
cally coherent when invoked as an objection to reparations, there are at least 
four possible responses. First, institutional racism in today’s society is, at least 
in part, the residue of slavery and Jim Crow laws.60 To the extent the harms are 
ongoing, reparations can be linked to the circumstances of contemporary 
Americans.61 Second, the theft of African American labor created much of the 
nation’s wealth, unjustly enriching U.S. citizens regardless of their individual 
culpability.62 The payment of restitution does not require any finding that indi-
viduals alive today are responsible for past transgressions; only that they have 
benefited from them and that it would be unjust for them to retain the benefit. 
Third, to the extent individuals identify with their nation and take pride in its 
achievements, they should also feel shame for its transgressions and welcome 
a chance to repair the nation’s tarnished honor.63 A fourth response to ethical 
individualism asserts that reparations are a matter of collective rather than in-
dividual obligation.64 
1. Continuing Wrong 
Perhaps the most direct response to the objection that today’s citizens are 
innocent of the evils inflicted on African Americans is to argue that those evils 
may have changed shape, but that they are still with us today.65 For example, 
critics have argued that mass incarceration of African Americans is a mecha-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL 
WEALTH GAP 9 (2017). 
 61 Id. (stating “that ‘the most striking fact about American economic history and politics is the 
brutal and systemic underdevelopment of black people’” (quoting MANNING MARABLE, HOW CAPI-
TALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA: PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SOCI-
ETY 1 (Haymarket Books 2015) (1983))). 
 62 See Lyons, supra note 7, at 1383. 
 63 See Gray, supra note 6, at 1074 (“Moral taint relies on linking the pride one often feels for 
accomplishments of a group or its members to the shame one ought to feel for harms caused by a 
group or associates.”). 
 64 One commentator has identified a fifth alternative, treating reparations as a form of “extraordi-
nary justice” immune from the ethical-individualism objection. Id. at 1050–51. Professor David Gray 
“argues that ‘I didn’t do it’ is a non sequitur in debates about reparations where the fundamental ques-
tion is ‘How do we make it right?’” Id. 
 65 See Lyons, supra note 7, at 1377 (“Most obstacles to validating reparations claims can be 
avoided by shifting our focus . . . from reparations for wrongs of the distant past to reparations for 
wrongs that continued under Jim Crow and persist today . . . .”). 
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nism for perpetuating “a state-sponsored racial caste system.”66 From this per-
spective, “[w]hat has changed since the collapse of Jim Crow has less to do 
with the basic structure of our society than with the language we use to justify 
it.”67 Those who have been incarcerated—disproportionately African American 
men68—are “subject to legalized discrimination for the rest of their lives.”69 As 
a practical matter, little has changed. 
Likewise, the local property tax financing structure used in most public-
school districts was designed in the South during the Jim Crow era for the pur-
pose of “facilitating segregation and inequality.”70 Given segregated patterns 
of home ownership, many school systems remain segregated by race.71 Local 
funding of school districts means that schools with a majority African Ameri-
can population are often starved of resources. Because the disparity between 
those school districts and “overwhelmingly white, wealthy school districts” is 
not explicitly based on race, however, the funding disparities have survived 
court challenges.72 
Even if one denies the claim that our current systems of mass incarcera-
tion and public education perpetuate white supremacy, it is impossible to argue 
in good faith that the Civil War marked the end of United States’ responsibility 
for the oppression of African Americans.73 After a brief period of Reconstruc-
tion, whites re-imposed a brutal system of racial domination, denying African 
Americans economic, social, and political rights. When asked to uphold the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS 15 (rev. ed. 2011). 
 67 Id. at 2. Mass incarceration of African Americans has its roots in the Jim Crow South where 
“entrepreneurs used the criminal justice system to re-enslave thousands of black men and work them, 
usually to death, in abhorrent labor camps.” BARADARAN, supra note 60, at 20. 
 68 Although “[s]tudies show that people of all colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably simi-
lar rates[,] black men have been admitted to prison on drug charges at rates twenty to fifty times 
greater than those of white men.” ALEXANDER, supra note 66, at 7 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, “in 
major cities wracked by the drug war, as many as 80 percent of young African American men now 
have criminal records and are thus subject to legalized discrimination for the rest of their lives.” Id. 
 69 Id. Professor Michelle Alexander concludes, “As a criminal you have scarcely more rights, and 
arguably less respect, than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow.” Id. at 2. 
 70 CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION, AND TAXPAYER CITIZEN-
SHIP, 1869–1973, at 175 (2018). 
 71 BARADARAN, supra note 60, at 254 (stating that a “majority of American children today attend 
de facto segregated schools that have resegregated with the passage of time and the absence of court 
mandates”). 
 72 WALSH, supra note 70, at 175 (arguing that “racially separate property tax bases have created 
dramatic disparities in the funding of white and black schools since the Civil War that Brown [v. Board 
of Education] did very little to change”). For example, in 1973, in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court ignored racial disparities between two school districts and 
held that social class did not trigger enhanced constitutional scrutiny. 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973). 
 73 See Lyons, supra note 7, at 1376 (“Chattel slavery was only the first stage of institutionalized 
racial subordination.”). 
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U.S. constitutional rights of African Americans, the U.S. Supreme Court in-
stead endorsed their subordination.74 For another century, this nation denied 
African Americans civil rights and relegated them to second class citizenship. 
Racist policing remains a serious concern today.75 
Nevertheless, it is still possible for individual citizens to assert their inno-
cence with respect to the harms inflicted upon African Americans throughout 
U.S. history.76 For example, those who have immigrated more recently might 
claim to have had no personal involvement in U.S. racial strife. Moreover, Af-
rican Americans would, in theory, be called upon to pay for their own repara-
tions.77 One response, that the next Section details, is that U.S. citizens all bene-
fit in the aggregate from societal wealth that originates in slave labor. At a mini-
mum, though, reflection upon the extent to which the abuse of African Ameri-
cans continued long past the end of slavery and affects the distribution of oppor-
tunities in our own era should undercut the force of objections that today’s citi-
zens face unwarranted persecution for the misdeeds of those long dead. 
2. Unjust Enrichment 
Rather than confronting the ethical-individualism objection directly, ad-
vocates of reparations might deny the significance of culpability altogether by 
framing the obligation to pay reparations in terms of unjust enrichment.78 Ac-
cording to restitution theory, if someone receives an unearned benefit, repay-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
 75 After we submitted this Article for publication, the deaths of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, 
and George Floyd led to nationwide Black Lives Matter protests. See Audra D.S. Burch et al., How 
Black Lives Matter Reached Every Corner of America, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2020/06/13/us/george-floyd-protests-cities-photos.html [https://perma.cc/F87R-
QE6Q] (observing that “[w]ithin 24 hours of Mr. Floyd’s death, demonstrations were organized in a half-
dozen U.S. cities, with protesters chanting the names of black people subjected to police brutality”). 
 76 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 379 (“Members of the dominant class continue to benefit from 
the wrongs of the past and the presumptions of inferiority imposed upon victims.”). 
 77 In the aggregate, African Americans would benefit from reparations, even if they also contrib-
uted pro rata to those reparations as citizens. Although questions of implementation are beyond the 
scope of this Article, we observe that one benefit of including all citizens, including African Ameri-
cans, is that it would signify that reparations are not a diminishment of their standing as citizens. See, 
e.g., Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 
TUL. L. REV. 597, 638 (1993) (“If society pays, it will do so at least in part with tax dollars, and Afri-
can Americans pay taxes. There is a ring of propriety in having African Americans share in the bene-
fits and burdens.”). Each African American taxpayer “will pay as a member of a society that benefit-
ted from the wrongs of the institution of slavery, and [each] will be compensated as a member of the 
injured group.” Id. at 639. 
 78 See Lyons, supra note 7, at 1383 (“It is important that this argument neither assumes nor im-
plies that those who owe restitution are morally responsible for the relevant inequities. It does not cast 
blame on those it would hold accountable.”). 
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ment may be required to the extent justice requires. For example, someone 
who receives a payment intended for another cannot retain the money.79 In a 
2009 case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia observed that 
“[t]o succeed on a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff need not show that 
the defendant is at fault, so long as he demonstrates that in spite of the defend-
ant’s ‘innocence in receiving the benefit,’ his retention of that benefit would be 
unjust.”80 If the toil of African Americans conferred an unearned benefit on 
today’s citizens, the question is whether it is just to retain the benefit without 
paying for it, not whether today’s citizens are responsible for wrongdoing.81 
The nation’s wealth stems in large part from slavery. In Professor Mehrsa 
Baradaran’s book, The Color of Money, she explains the link: 
Slavery, ‘America’s original sin,’ according to James Madison, cre-
ated the foundation of modern American capitalism. It was slavery 
and the ‘blood drawn with the lash’ that opened the arteries of capi-
tal and commerce that led to U.S. economic dominance worldwide. 
The effects of the institution of slavery on American commerce were 
monumental—3.2 million slaves were worth $1.3 billion in market 
value, almost equal to the entire gross national product.82 
For this reason, slavery was tolerated in the United States despite its odious-
ness.83 The oppression of African Americans was simply too profitable to 
abandon. 
Opponents might argue that slavery was not illegal and that to garner any 
profits generated from it would “violate . . . the prohibition on retroactivity, 
                                                                                                                           
 79 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: MISTAKE AS TO PAYEE § 22 (AM. L. INST. 1937) (“A 
person who has paid money to or for the account of another not intended by him, is entitled to restitu-
tion from the payee or from the beneficiary of the payment, unless the payee or beneficiary is protect-
ed as a contracting party or as a bona fide purchaser.”). 
 80 Qatar Nat’l Bank v. Winmar, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Standard Ins. 
Co. v. Burch, 540 F. Supp. 2d 98, 105 (D.D.C. 2008)) (requiring a construction company to disgorge 
payments it received from a customer’s bank without the customer’s authorization). 
 81 See Lyons, supra note 7, at 1382. Professor David Lyons argues: 
The class of unjustly enriched, and therefore potentially accountable, third parties can 
be much wider than the class of wrongdoers. In the present context, that difference may 
be quite important, for no one who can be held responsible for slavery is still alive and 
relatively few are still alive who can be held responsible for sustaining Jim Crow, as 
compared with those who might be regarded as unjustly enriched by the effects of racial 
stratification. 
Id. 
 82 BARADARAN, supra note 60, at 10 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting ANDREW DELBANCO, THE 
ABOLITIONIST IMAGINATION 68–69 (2012); and then quoting Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Ad-
dress, AVALON PROJECT (Mar. 4, 1865), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln2.asp [https://
perma.cc/X3SS-4X3L]). 
 83 See id. 
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according to which the legal status of actions and transactions must be deter-
mined by the applicable rules of their time.”84 The moral depravity of slavery 
was routinely acknowledged, however, even by those who benefited from the 
institution, and so the choice to own other human beings and to profit from 
their labor cannot be excused as a mere product of the times and circumstanc-
es.85 As a matter of economic incentives, moreover, it may be desirable to al-
low retroactive actions so that individuals are not tempted to rest on legal tech-
nicalities when they know or should know better.86 
Another limitation of the unjust enrichment approach is that it ignores the 
harm suffered by the victims.87 The restitutionary remedy is calculated accord-
ing to the beneficiary’s gain. For example, “[r]eparations cannot be made sole-
ly on the basis of a wrong, like murder or torture, that did not measurably en-
rich the wrongdoer.”88 Also, even if the wrongdoer did benefit, unjust enrich-
ment carries with it certain “empirical difficulties.”89 In particular, restitution 
ordinarily requires a showing with reasonable precision of what was lost, who 
lost, and who benefited.90 The economic consequences of centuries of chattel 
slavery and legalized discrimination can only be approximated.91 Given the 
time period at issue, any calculation of the value of African American labor 
and its causal relation to the current financial position of the United States and 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational 
Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1166 (2004). 
 85 Id. at 1172 (“However socially constructed our reality is, engaging voluntarily in a social and 
economic practice, such as slavery, which involves the degradation of the dignity of other human 
beings cannot be seriously characterized as a matter of luck or circumstance, especially in a context 
(as was the context throughout the sad history of U.S. slavery) where its moral propriety is constantly 
being challenged.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 86 Id. at 1169 (arguing that by preserving the possibility of retroactivity, “the legal system can 
encourage [citizens] to anticipate new law and adjust their behavior in anticipation” (citing Louis 
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 513–14, 615–17 (1986) 
(applying an economic analysis to changes in public policy))). 
 87 Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2004) (con-
tending that unjust enrichment “lacks the moral force necessary to resolve a controversial public dis-
pute about moral rights and obligations among segments of society”). 
 88 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 701. 
 89 Id. at 702; see also Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 
56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1368 (2015) (noting that determining the “holdings that would have resulted 
without slavery in this country involves additional complications”). 
 90 See generally Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191 (1995) (empha-
sizing that unjust enrichment is central to the remedy of restitution). 
 91 See Sherwin, supra note 87, at 1445 (“If the initial injury can somehow be defined, the passage 
of time and the countless human acts and choices that have intervened lead to daunting problems in 
tracing the injury to current generations of African Americans and separating the harm of enslavement 
from the effects of more recent public and private acts.”). 
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its citizens will be debatable.92 To the extent unjust enrichment circumvents the 
problem of moral culpability, therefore, it may exacerbate practical concerns 
regarding the design of a reparations program. 
3. Moral Taint 
Still another answer to ethical individualism is to assert that the objection 
concerns only the formal attribution of blame. Even if there are not sufficient 
grounds to hold them responsible based on their own actions, individuals may 
still feel a sense of shame because of some shared connection with the wrong-
doers.93 Moral taint turns on “the psychology of collective guilt.”94 The same 
phenomenon can apply to a nation’s conduct: for individual citizens who are 
patriots, “[s]hame, and thus liability, follow . . . as a matter of psychological 
consistency.”95 To acknowledge the shamefulness of slavery and Jim Crow, 
individuals might agree to pay reparations despite a lack of personal involve-
ment in the wrongdoing.96 
Critics have pointed out that the argument functions more on an emotion-
al than a logical level.97 Couching arguments for reparations in terms of moral 
taint can be effective as rhetoric, but, if ethical individualism is a valid con-
cern, it cannot be the case that individual citizens bear responsibility for what 
others have done simply because they share a flag or an ethnic identity.98 In-
deed, arguments for collective obligation framed in terms of moral taint can 
shade uncomfortably close to group prejudice.99 Also, although the psycholog-
ical phenomenon of moral taint may be real, it is by its nature not the kind of 
argument that can be deployed against those who deny that they have any re-
sponsibility. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 As Professor Emily Sherwin further observes, “The problem of linking past harm to present 
claimants is not only a problem of proof, but also one of logic because few if any current claimants 
would exist in a counterfactual world in which slavery did not occur.” Id. 
 93 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 709. 
 94 Id. at 710. 
 95 Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 198–99 & n.72 (“[T]here must be a group of objects and events . . . 
that are so prominently linked to American identity that virtually every American sees [themselves] as 
the author of at least some of them and feels pride or shame with regard to them.” (quoting Meir Dan-
Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 987 (1992))). 
 96 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 710 (“Some reparations programs might be ex-
plained as efforts to remove a moral taint.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 7, at 1379 (“I am not confident that valid moral claims to compen-
sation can be inherited, or that moral debts can be transmitted to one’s heirs, for that suggests the 
moral guilt of ancestors can be transmitted to their descendants.”). 
 98 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 710 (“Most people reject the core ethical collectivist 
argument that a Jew, for example, is guilty of the wrongful act of other Jews . . . .”). 
 99 Gray, supra note 6, at 1079 (describing the “associational view of group responsibility” as 
“troubling”). 
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In the context of U.S. reparations, perhaps the most that one can say is 
that moral taint exerts a conditional form of obligation. Anyone who takes 
pride in this country’s achievements should also be willing to acknowledge its 
shortcomings.100 If patriotism is love of country, therefore, patriotism should 
take as its object the country that actually exists.101 Rather than jettisoning the 
nation’s history in favor of a sanitized, mythological version, those who are 
patriots should embrace the work necessary to perfect the nation they love.102 
That task cannot be accomplished without dealing with the legacy of slavery and 
Jim Crow. In this sense, reparations can be seen as a kind of patriotism: a nation 
willing to hold itself to a higher moral standard is one worth celebrating. 
4. Collective Responsibility 
Finally, and in line with this Article’s central claim that the United States 
is analogous to a corporation and responsible for its own wrongdoing, another 
way to surmount the ethical-individualism objection is to argue that rights and 
obligations can be incurred by groups as well as individuals.103 As one com-
mentator explains, “If society as a collective entity is morally responsible, then 
its members may be called upon, as an incident of membership—not personal 
blame—to share the cost incurred by society in meeting its moral obliga-
tions.”104 Crucially, however, “the case for holding American society responsi-
ble for past discrimination depends on the plausibility of recognizing American 
society as a collective and continuing nation, the obligations of which fairly 
pass through time and generations.”105 Put simply, can we link current citizens 
to past wrongs? In this regard, theories of collective responsibility vary widely. 
In looser, more informal groups, individual liability depends on con-
scious, voluntary participation. For example, if a person agrees with others to 
do something illegal and one of those individuals takes a step toward accom-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Coates, supra note 2 (“The last slaveholder has been dead for a very long time. The last 
soldier to endure Valley Forge has been dead much longer. To proudly claim the veteran and disown 
the slaveholder is patriotism à la carte.”). 
 101 See ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 2 (2006) (“We do not 
celebrate our democratic traditions more faithfully by identifying them incorrectly.”). 
 102 This account of patriotism is not only more constructive than love-it-or-leave-it expressions of 
wounded outrage, but it is more inclusive. 
 103 See CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 138 (2000) 
(“When we act together, we are each accountable for what all do, because we are each authors of our 
collective acts.”). Individuals often view arguments for collective responsibility with hostility within 
our political and legal systems because collective responsibility conflicts with the individualism at the 
heart of classical liberalism. See Morton J. Horwitz, Commentary, The Jurisprudence of Brown and 
the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 608 (1979). 
 104 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 10, at 725. 
 105 Id. at 726. 
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plishing the illegal objective, all of the members of the conspiracy are liable.106 
It is not a defense that someone else performed the overt act because each in-
dividual had agreed to participate.107 Yet, the conspiracy extends no further 
than the zone of conscious participation; it does not reach bystanders or family 
members, let alone descendants of the original conspirators. Nor can an indi-
vidual be held criminally responsible, except perhaps as an accomplice after 
the fact, for wrongs committed before the individual joined the conspiracy. 
General partnership law likewise depends on the voluntary association of 
each individual, without which the partnership would not exist.108 Under the 
default rules of partnership, the exit of any partner triggers the dissolution of 
the partnership.109 Thus, the liability each partner has for debts of the partner-
ship arises by virtue of that partner’s choice to participate. Also, each partner’s 
responsibility for partnership debts begins at the moment the partner joins and 
does not extend backward in time.110 Thus, the associational view of collective 
liability does not provide a complete answer to the ethical-individualism objec-
tion to reparations because it fails to connect contemporary citizens to past 
wrongs.111 
Although corporations are a more formal type of collective entity than a 
general partnership, some scholars assert that voluntary association remains an 
essential ingredient: “[a] person can be blamed for the wrongful acts of others 
when he voluntarily enters certain relationships with these others.”112 Notably, 
this view conflates corporations with partnerships and would not assign re-
sponsibility to shareholders for reasons different than would apply to “any 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Julia Cheung et al., Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 595 (1994). 
 107 See id. at 621–22. 
 108 The definition of a partnership is the voluntary “association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners a business for profit.” REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 
2013). 
 109 Mark Anderson, Entity Exit: Rights, Remedies, and Bounded Rationality, 17 HOUS. BUS. & 
TAX L.J. 1, 5 (2016). 
 110 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(b). 
 111 Professor Sepinwall recognizes this difficulty and seeks to overcome it by noting that the con-
tinuation of a group depends on new members choosing to associate themselves with the group. For 
this reason, she argues that current members can be held responsible for prior wrongs committed by 
the group. See Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 215 (“Contemporary citizens incur the nation’s debts, in-
cluding its debt for slavery, then, because they extend the nation itself.”). This Article’s argument 
differs because it contends that the nation is in all relevant respects an incorporated entity and has 
individual responsibility for wrongdoing apart from the involvement of citizens, past, present, or fu-
ture. As taxpayers, citizens pay for reparations, but they are not the subject of blame, individual or 
collective. See discussion infra Part III. 
 112 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 703 (“People enter relationships in order to obtain the 
benefits of collective action; in the process they become blameworthy for the harms that occur as a 
result of collective action.”); see also Brophy, supra note 43, at 1202 (“Corporations, which are really 
a collection of individual shareholders, are liable for the acts of their employees.”). 
2021] A Corporate Law Rationale for Reparations 819 
group that consists of volunteers.”113 Moreover, a methodology for determin-
ing collective obligations on a going-forward basis does not provide logical 
support for reparations based on past wrongs. 
If framed in terms of each individual’s voluntary association, there is still 
“a distribution problem, which theories of collective responsibility cannot re-
solve.”114 Moving the analysis inside a corporate structure does not answer the 
ethical-individualism objection.115 Therefore, if collective responsibility is un-
derstood in terms of voluntary association, it appears to follow that “reliance 
on the corporate fiction to make blameless people pay for the collective 
wrongs of earlier shareholders is a doubtful ploy.”116 That is, the corporate 
analogy for reparations falls short if it cannot explain why today’s citizens are 
responsible.117 
Alternatively, though, one might answer the ethical-individualism objec-
tion by asserting that the entity should be recognized as a person with inde-
pendent moral responsibility for its actions.118 According to this view of corpo-
rate liability, the responsibility of individual shareholders is not relevant to the 
analysis. Although “[s]hareholders, employees, and other members are . . . 
harmed as a consequence, . . . their claims are incidental and derivative.”119 
Unlike theories based on voluntary association, shareholders’ obligation to 
shoulder their share of financial burdens does not turn on when the corporation 
incurred any particular liability as long as the corporation remains obligated to 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704. As one scholar points out, concepts of collective 
responsibility that depend on voluntary association “crucially rest upon individualist understandings 
of responsibility, and so fail to be collective in the requisite sense.” Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 190. 
 114 Gray, supra note 11, at 65. 
 115 See, e.g., id. (arguing that although corporate law may contain mechanisms for attribution, it 
remains a fundamental problem that “it may not always be clear that an individual’s conduct can be 
attributed to a group”). 
 116 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 705 (canvasing responses to ethical individualism and 
distinguishing theories of corporate law that attribute moral agency to the corporation from theories 
that reject corporate liability separate from individual participation and culpability); see also Sepin-
wall, supra note 6, at 190 (concluding that an unfortunate implication of the associational view is that 
“accounts of collective responsibility cannot be extended to historical injustices, like slavery, for it is 
clear that current citizens have no ability to control the 150-year-old actions of the United States”). 
 117 Gray, supra note 11, at 65 (“Just because the conduct of some individuals may rightly be at-
tributed to a corporation or group does not mean that the consequences for that conduct can rightly fall 
upon all members in the form of obligations to contribute to reparations programs.”). 
 118 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704 (“Once we take this step, we can demand that cor-
porations pay when they commit wrongs . . . .”). Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule summa-
rize the possibilities regarding corporate responsibility, but their goal is descriptive—to clarify the 
possible lines of argument for and against reparations. See id. They do not endorse any particular 
theory, nor do they provide reasons for preferring one view of corporate liability over another. See id. 
 119 Id. 
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satisfy the liability.120 The benefits and detriments of share ownership are dis-
tributed to shareholders pro rata according to stock holdings. 
II. UNITED STATES, INC. 
This Part argues that the latter understanding of the corporation is correct; 
unlike a conspiracy, or, for that matter, a general business partnership, a corpo-
ration is characterized by its legal personhood.121 Consequently, there is no 
requirement that each individual be connected to the wrongdoing to bear a 
share of the collective responsibility for it. This Part further contends that the 
United States resembles an incorporated venture in ways that are pertinent to 
the reparations debate.122 In particular, corporate law introduces the concept of 
legal personhood, and legal personhood provides the key to answering the eth-
ical-individualism objection to reparations. 
The most distinctive feature of corporate law is that it imbues the corpora-
tion with legal personhood.123 Although extending constitutional rights to cor-
porations based on their personhood has engendered enormous controversy,124 
and some commentators have questioned whether corporations are the type of 
moral persons that can form the mens rea necessary to violate the criminal 
law,125 those controversies should not blind us to the well-established and non-
                                                                                                                           
 120 See Ogletree, supra note 29, at 1069 (“I believe that suing a corporation is much different than 
suing a person. Legally, corporations are immortal . . . . And where that company owes its present 
profitability to its slave trading, that company should . . . make some form of restitution.”). 
 121 See discussion infra Part II. 
 122 See discussion infra Part II. 
 123 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A corpora-
tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”). For this 
reason, as Chief Justice Marshall observed, a key feature of corporate personhood is that it facilitates 
the continuity of operations over time without need to account for changes in stock ownership. See id. 
(“Among the most important [characteristics of the corporation] are immortality, and, if the expres-
sion may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are 
considered as the same, and may act as a single individual.”). Or, put differently, “[i]t is chiefly for the 
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations 
were invented, and are in use.” Id. 
 124 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253, 256 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (observing that corporations hijacked the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for their own benefit: “[t]hus, the Court converted an 
amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an amendment whose major effect, 
for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights of corporations”); Pollman, supra note 16, at 1647 
(“Mapping the panoply of corporate rights and the rationale for them has become increasingly com-
plex, and what the doctrine of corporate personhood stands for has become obscured.”). 
 125 See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and 
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 599–601 (1996); Peter J. Henning, The Co-
nundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights 
of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 797 (1996); Andrew Weissman & 
David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 124 (2007). 
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controversial conception of corporate personhood, according to which corpora-
tions can own property, enter into contracts, sue, and be sued.126 Nor is it nec-
essary to decide whether the corporation is best understood as a real person,127 
an artificial person that is a concession of the state, or a nexus of contracts 
among private parties.128 What matters is that, by statute, a corporation is au-
thorized to act as a person in its relations with others and to incur obligations 
to those with whom it interacts.129 
Unpacking the nature of corporate personhood is important because it 
furnishes a direct response to the two interwoven objections of ethical individ-
ualism: (1) that group liability for reparations is not appropriate because indi-
vidual members may be innocent; and (2) that those alive today are not respon-
sible for the actions of earlier generations. This Part’s argument proceeds in 
four steps. Section A explains why corporate personhood provides a convinc-
ing answer to ethical individualism.130 Section B contends that when assessing 
its collective responsibility for past wrongs, the United States is best under-
stood as a corporation.131 Section C distinguishes partnerships, which depend 
upon the voluntary association of individual participants.132 Section D argues 
that corporate law also rebuts a meta-version of the ethical-individualism ob-
jection, that the United States is no longer the same person it was in the pre-
Civil War era and cannot be liable for the misdeeds of a predecessor regime.133  
A. Consequences of Personhood 
In a corporation, individual innocence is irrelevant because the responsi-
ble person is the entity itself. As holders of a residual claim to the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 1.2, at 3 (1997) (“The corporation holds 
property, enters into contracts, executes conveyances, and conducts litigation in a legal capacity sepa-
rate and distinct from its shareholders.”); Pollman, supra note 16, at 1663 (“That corporations have a 
‘legal personality’ allowing them to contract, own property, sue and be sued is not controversial.”). 
 127 For advocacy of this view, see Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 253, 261 (1911) (“A corporation exists as an objectively real entity . . . the law merely recogniz-
es and gives legal effect to the existence of this entity.”); see also Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as 
Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 495 (2001). 
 128 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1462 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
 129 The controversy regarding corporate constitutional rights is, among other things, a conflict 
between federal and state control. As Justice Black observed in 1938, dissenting from the extension of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to corporations in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 
303 U.S. 77 (1938), “granting new and revolutionary rights to corporations” would “deprive the states 
of their long-recognized power to regulate corporations.” Id. at 86, 89 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 130 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 131 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 132 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 133 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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assets, shareholders hope the corporation will earn profits and increase in val-
ue; equally, however, they run the risk that the corporation may suffer losses 
instead.134 Indeed, shareholders cannot deny their responsibility, “even if the 
current shareholders—the ones who must pay through devaluation of their 
shares—are different from the shareholders at the time the wrong was commit-
ted.”135 It follows that the lifespan of a corporation is measured separately 
from the lives of its individual stockholders. Unlike a natural person, a corpo-
ration has no predetermined lifespan and can, in theory, live forever.136 
Some commentators have raised concerns rooted in ethical individualism 
regarding the imposition of liability in the corporate context, especially crimi-
nal sanctions, because those sanctions inevitably flow through to shareholders 
and employees.137 Corporate personhood is, after all, a legal fiction. Regard-
less of whether the corporation is a legal person for certain practical purposes, 
one might ask how as a normative matter can a legal fiction circumvent the 
problem of punishing blameless individuals? There are several answers, each 
which seems to pertain to the question of U.S. reparations. 
First, holding a corporation liable does not stigmatize its shareholders or 
employees.138 Their moral blamelessness remains unquestioned, even if the 
corporation is convicted of a crime. The financial consequences might be more 
accurately characterized as a form of indirect responsibility, akin to an indem-
nification agreement.139 To this extent, entity liability does not conflict with the 
precepts of ethical individualism. Likewise, if the United States were to pay 
reparations to African Americans, that would not be a statement that anyone 
alive today owned slaves or was responsible for Jim Crow laws. 
Second, shareholders may be held to their investment decision and em-
ployees to the ordinary risks of working life. Even those who inherit stock are 
not required to keep it. That is, “employees and stockholders accede to a dis-
tributional scheme in which profits and losses from corporate activities are 
                                                                                                                           
 134 As long as there is no fraud that would warrant disregarding the corporate form, the maximum 
exposure for each shareholder is the full amount of their investment in the corporation. The financial 
exposure of a citizen is different because the government has the power to levy taxes. 
 135 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704. 
 136 See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 773 
(2012) (stating that a “defining attribute of the corporation is perpetual existence”). For this reason, 
one commentator argued that corporations that owe their “present profitability to [their] slave trading 
. . . should acknowledge that fact and make some form of restitution.” Ogletree, supra note 29, at 
1069 (observing that because corporations have an indefinite lifespan, “a company that is around in 
2002 can be the same company that was around in 1602”). 
 137 Fisse, supra note 56, at 1175. 
 138 Id. (contending that “cost-bearing associates are not themselves subject to the stigma of con-
viction and criminal punishment—they are not convicts but rather corporate distributes”). 
 139 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704 (explaining that on this theory of direct, entity 
responsibility, shareholders only indirectly benefit or face harm). 
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distributed on the basis of position in the company or type of investment rather 
than degree of deserved praise or blame.”140 It is part of the bargain that corpo-
rate losses reduce the value of their financial and human-capital investments, 
just as corporate gains may enhance them. Accordingly, even very recent im-
migrants to the United States must accept their share of responsibility for the 
nation’s obligations, just as they are entitled to benefit from the privileges of 
citizenship.141 
Third, and perhaps most significant, the alternative would be to hold col-
lective organizations harmless regardless of the harm they cause. As one com-
mentator argues, “[N]ot to internalize the social costs of corporate crime 
through punishment of the corporations responsible is to adopt a system which 
allows the wrong-doing corporation and its associates to enjoy a dispropor-
tionately large allocation of resources at society’s expense.”142 The ethical-
individualism objection proves too much because it would make corporate lia-
bility an impossibility in all but the rarest circumstances involving widespread 
shareholder complicity. Likewise, the United States should not be able to avoid 
responsibility for its actions by identifying citizens who have dissented from 
them.143 
It might be objected, however, that the corporate personhood analogy for 
U.S. reparations has already failed an important test because courts have re-
jected legal claims against corporations that allegedly profited from slavery. 
For example, in 2004, in In re African-American Slave Descendants, a consol-
idated action against eighteen corporations,144 civil rights lawyers brought “a 
claim for reparations rooted in the historic injustices and the immorality of the 
institution of human chattel slavery in the United States.”145 More specifically, 
the plaintiffs’ theory was that the defendant corporations (or their predecessor 
entities) had been in continuous existence and could be asked to pay for their 
own wrongful acts.146 Yet, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Fisse, supra note 56, at 1175. 
 141 The government acts with the consent of the governed in a free society because citizens are 
“participants in an on-going political system, committed to uphold that system and abide by its rules.” 
MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP, at xiii 
(1970). 
 142 Fisse, supra note 56, at 1175–76. 
 143 See WALZER, supra note 141, at xiii (“When we elect representatives, we certainly consent to 
their authority (and we do so whether we have supported the winner or not) . . . .”). 
 144 See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (2004); Robert F. 
Worth, Companies Are Sued for Slave Reparations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002 (§ 2), at 2. 
 145 In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 146 For example, in 2004, in In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the CSX railroad company was “a successor-in-interest to numerous predecessor railroad 
lines that were constructed or run, at least in part, by slave labor.” Id. at 1040 (quoting First Consoli-
dated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 131, id. (MDL No. 1491, No. 02 CV 7764)). 
824 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:799 
Illinois held that the plaintiffs, a class including the descendants of African 
American slaves, lacked standing.147 The court further concluded as a pruden-
tial matter that the consolidated complaint set forth a generalized grievance 
better suited to resolution by the legislature than by a court and that reparations 
are a “political question.”148 Finally, the court held that reparations claims 
against the defendant corporations were barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitations.149 
Notably, though, the Illinois court’s rejection of class action litigation 
against the defendant corporations for their complicity in slavery focused on 
issues of law, not whether the corporations bore moral responsibility. In dis-
missing the class litigation, the court was careful not to disparage the plaintiffs’ 
underlying theory of corporate identity. Subsequently, in a number of cases, 
corporations and other long-lived institutions have taken up the question vol-
untarily and have instituted reparations of their own accord. For example, 
Georgetown University has created a program to give preferential admissions 
to descendants of 272 slaves that Georgetown sold in 1838 to secure funding 
for its early operations.150 More recently, students attending Georgetown Uni-
versity voted overwhelmingly in favor of a reparations fund that would be paid 
by student fees of $27.20 per semester.151 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. at 1047. 
 148 Id. at 1053–54. Yet, as others have observed, “the court could as easily have addressed the 
issues of remoteness and attenuation through doctrines such as duty and proximate causation, thereby 
managing its institutional capacity without unnecessarily and undesirably abdicating its responsibility 
to uphold and apply tort law’s normative principles.” Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods 
and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 384 n.113 (2011). 
 149 Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (“If cognizable claims ever exist-
ed, those claims were owned by former slaves themselves, and became time-barred when the statutes 
of limitations expired in the nineteenth century.”). 
 150 See Molly Olmstead, Georgetown Students Vote to Add Fee for Slavery Reparations to Tuition, 
SLATE (Apr. 12, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/georgetown-students-reparations-
fund-vote.html [https://perma.cc/3YKP-FB72]. 
 151 See id. If approved by Georgetown University’s board of trustees, the fee would represent “the 
first time an American university financially addresses its past as a slave-owning institution.” Id.; Jesús 
A. Rodríguez, This Could Be the First Slavery Reparations Policy in America, POLITICO MAG. (Apr. 9, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/09/georgetown-university-reparations-slave-
trade-226581 [https://perma.cc/LX8R-3NZS]. In voting to approve the reparations fund, students 
rejected an ethical-individualism objection that argued current students could not be responsible for 
the Georgetown’s past actions. See Samuel Dubke & Hayley Grande, Viewpoint: Vote ‘No’ on GU272 
Referendum, THE HOYA (Feb. 16, 2019), https://thehoya.com/viewpoint-vote-no-gu272-referendum/ 
[https://perma.cc/T2JM-49AK] (“While we agree that the Georgetown of today would not exist if not 
for the sale of 272 slaves in 1838, current students are not to blame for the past sins of the institution, 
and a financial contribution cannot reconcile this past debt on behalf of the university.”). As one re-
porter observed, “Georgetown isn’t the only institution grappling with its past. At a growing number 
of schools, scholars have delved into the more fraught aspects of their universities’ histories, and ad-
ministrators have acknowledged the roles their institutions played in the horrors of slavery and its 
lasting legacy.” Susan Svrluga, Georgetown Students Vote on Reparations for the Descendants of 
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To summarize, this Article has argued that the entity status of the corpora-
tion is a way of harnessing collective economic power through an established 
governance structure. Investors benefit when the corporation increases in value 
and cannot complain that they have been treated unfairly if corporate wrongdo-
ing reduces the value of their investment. Although the passage of time may 
render certain claims non-justiciable as a legal matter, impediments to legal 
recovery do not affect the moral basis for reparations. If, as Section B argues, 
the United States has independent, corporate status as an entity, its liability for 
wrongdoing must be assessed based on its own actions apart from any contri-
bution from particular citizens. In other words, our claim is that the United 
States is the individual for purposes of ethical-individualism analysis.152 
B. The U.S. Corporate Charter 
As a matter of political classification, the United States is a representative 
democracy; as a practical matter, though, the United States resembles a corpo-
ration.153 To support that assertion, this Article shows that the United States 
relies upon the same “governance technology” as a corporation,154 that the 
Founders used corporate law as the principal template for the Constitution,155 
and that “key members of the founding generation” readily characterized the 
United States as a corporation.156 Through corporate law, the Founders were 
able to meet their overriding objective, creating a political entity grounded in 
popular consent but legally distinct from the People and the vicissitudes of un-
tempered rule by a majority of citizens.157 
                                                                                                                           
Slaves, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/georgetown-
students-vote-on-reparations-for-the-descendants-of-slaves/2019/04/11/ddd69f2a-5c99-11e9-842d-
7d3ed7eb3957_story.html [https://perma.cc/V334-GHPV]. 
 152 For historical context regarding the implications of corporate personhood, see generally W. 
Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons Under the Criminal Law, 
45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479 (2018). 
 153 See, e.g., Ciepley, supra note 15, at 419. Professor David Ciepley explains: 
[T]he Constitution is neither a contract among individuals to form a people, nor a con-
tract between a people and a ruler. Social contract theory simply does not capture the 
true lineage, or structure, or purposes of the American Constitution. Instead, the Consti-
tution should be seen as a popularly issued corporate charter . . . . 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 154 Id. at 434 (emphasis omitted). 
 155 Id. at 419. 
 156 Id. at 432. 
 157 Id. at 431 (arguing that the Founders used corporate law to distinguish the People acting in 
their capacities as a “chartering sovereign and electing multitude”). As citizens, the People are not 
entitled to exercise the plenary power of sovereignty, which they have delegated. Id. 
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1. Functional Similarities 
Corporations have several defining characteristics that are relevant for our 
purposes. First, a corporation has perpetual life and is not limited to the 
lifespan of its shareholders. Second, authority is delegated to corporations by 
state law for defined purposes and exists only to the extent delegated. Accord-
ingly, a corporation lacks plenary powers but can enact by-laws consistent with 
its delegated authority.158 Third, a corporation is run by its elected board of 
directors, not by its shareholders.159 Finally, a corporation has its own assets 
and can hold property, enter into contracts, and otherwise transact business as a 
legal person.160 
The United States follows these same principles of corporate design.161 
Like a corporation, the United States is capable of continuing in perpetuity: 
“[i]nstitutions, such as corporations and political organizations, can be held 
accountable and are capable of existing for many generations.”162 Consequent-
ly, “a government can retain a morally relevant identity for a very substantial 
period of time.”163 Corporate law also explains why the U.S. government 
wields authority only to the extent it has been delegated that power, and not as 
an independent sovereign.164 The British model of political authority vested the 
full powers of sovereignty in the government, but the Founders gave the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 158 It is well established that “[c]orporations are creatures of state law.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 
471, 478 (1979) (first quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); and then quot-
ing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)). 
 159 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (2002) (“Although 
shareholders nominally ‘own’ the corporation, they have virtually no decisionmaking powers—just 
the right to elect the firm’s directors and to vote on an exceedingly limited—albeit not unimportant—
number of corporate actions.”). For an important, early statement regarding the separation of owner-
ship and control, see generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 160 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (stating that a corporation “has 
the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and 
affairs”). 
 161 John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commen-
tary on “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution by Gary Lawson and 
Guy Seidman, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407, 421 (2019) (“[T]he United States possesses all of the 
tacit corporate powers identified by Blackstone, Wilson, and other writers, including perpetual succes-
sion; the power to sue and be sued; the power to acquire, hold, and convey property; the power to 
operate under a common seal; and the power to enact by-laws.”); see also James D. Nelson, Corpo-
rate Disestablishment, 105 VA. L. REV. 595, 626 (2019) (noting the “structural similarities between 
corporate and state power”). 
 162 Lyons, supra note 7, at 1385. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1436 (1987) (stating 
that “government entities were sovereign only in a limited and derivative sense, exercising authority 
only within the boundaries set by the sovereign People”). 
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government the powers of a corporation, which are limited because they derive 
from a separate sovereign.165 
The limited nature of the government’s power confines its ability to write 
laws. Just as a corporation has the authority to issue by-laws that bind its con-
stituents subject to the constraints of corporate law authority delegated from 
the state, the U.S. government can enact laws only up to the limits of its consti-
tutional powers.166 Laws that exceed the powers vested in government by the 
U.S. Constitution are invalid.167 The boundaries of the lawmaking power are 
set through judicial review, an innovation that borrowed from corporate law 
precedent and would not have been relevant in the British context where the 
government’s powers were not subject to formal limitation. Thus, the institution 
of judicial review in the United States as a check on legislative authority sup-
ports the conclusion that the United States is a corporation.168 
The constitutional structure of our representative democracy further 
strengthens the corporate law analogy. In the United States, the exercise of po-
litical power is channeled into designated offices, akin to a corporation’s board 
of directors and officers. Following corporate law, the Founders vested “au-
thority in the office, not in the officeholder; the officeholder serving, not as a 
direct agent of the sovereign, but as a dual fiduciary, to the electorate and to 
the purposes and procedures established by the sovereign’s charter.”169 It is 
also notable that citizens and shareholders have no direct participatory role in 
government. In a corporation, shareholders elect the board of directors; in the 
United States, citizens elect local, state, and federal representatives. With the 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See id. at 1434 (“Just as corporate officials lacked lawful authority to go beyond the scope of 
their corporate charter, so conduct by government officials that transgressed substantive ‘constitution-
al’ limitations was null and void.”). In the British system, although the People were sovereign in theo-
ry, the entirety of their power was delegated to the King, Lords, and Parliament, so that there were no 
limits on government power. See id. at 1432 (“Since the King-in-Parliament was itself the virtual 
embodiment of the British Constitution and the British People, how could any principle, however 
venerable, supersede that body’s sovereign will? Talk of ‘void’ parliamentary enactments was non-
sense—or treason.”). 
 166 The power to enact by-laws “distinguishes a corporation from ‘a mere voluntary assembly,’ 
which cannot frame rules ‘which would have any binding force, for want of a coercive power to create 
a sufficient obligation.’” Ciepley, supra note 15, at 420 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *293). 
 167 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority, 
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, there-
fore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”). 
 168 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 504 (2006) 
(arguing that “judicial review arose from a longstanding English corporate practice under which a 
corporation’s ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy to the laws of England”). 
 169 Ciepley, supra note 15, at 434. 
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exception of a few state laws that provide for direct democracy initiatives,170 
neither citizens nor shareholders have the right to instruct their representatives 
on how to vote.171 Thus, the people’s theoretical capacity to exercise sover-
eignty to establish or revise the architecture of government does not translate 
into day-to-day control of how the government operates.172 
To be clear, it is not our contention that democracy works the same way 
in a corporation as it does in local, state, or national politics.173 There are many 
significant differences, beginning with the fact that voting power in a corpora-
tion is allocated based on capital investment rather than per person.174 Also, 
corporations are primarily oriented toward profit-seeking ventures,175 whereas 
the nation’s objectives are more open-ended and require elected officials to 
grapple with the pluralistic values of the citizens whose votes they seek. We 
contend only that U.S. democracy resembles a corporation in that it is charac-
terized by a limited delegation of power by charter policed through the institu-
tion of judicial review, an establishment of offices through which elected rep-
resentatives exercise power, and the creation of a legal person, the United 
States, separate from the individual citizens of any particular era. 
2. Corporate Law as Precedent 
It is no accident that the United States resembles a corporation. Strong ev-
idence supports the conclusion that the Founders used corporate law as their 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Sherman Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 434–
35 (1998). 
 171 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[T]he business and affairs of 
the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction . . . of the board of directors.”). 
 172 The citizens of the United States form a “[P]eople” when they convene through established 
procedures to modify the constitutional compact. See Ciepley, supra note 15, at 425 (“Only when 
gathered in general assembly at the proper time and place do the members assume their corporate 
capacity . . . . At all other times, the members are but a multitude of individuals and remain bound by 
the reigning rules of the body until such time as they are duly changed.” (citation omitted)). 
 173 For criticism of arguments that equate the private and the public spheres, see generally Tom 
C.W. Lin, CEOs and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351 (2014); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive 
Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 (2006). 
 174 See David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the 
Rule of “One Share, One Vote,” 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (1970). 
 175 The extent to which corporations are required to maximize profits regardless of other consid-
erations is the subject of perennial debate. For a classic exchange of views, compare A. Berle, Jr., For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (arguing that cor-
porations are only accountable to shareholders), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (asserting that corporations have obligations to 
society as well as their shareholders). See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambiva-
lence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Argu-
ments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). 
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template when devising a form of government for the American colonies.176 
First, corporate law had already been used for this purpose. Under British rule, 
several of the first American colonies were chartered as corporations.177 The 
Virginia Company and the Massachusetts Bay Company, in particular, had 
written constitutions that were corporate in form—“[u]nlike bare bills of rights 
or contractual agreements with rulers, such as the Magna Carta, a corporate 
charter establishes a government.”178 As one commentator explains: 
The colonial experience during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies had prepared the ground for revolutionary ideas. In many col-
onies, written “constitutions” prescribed substantive limits on the 
powers of the colonial government. Several of these colonial “con-
stitutions” had originally been designed as corporate charters.179 
Notably, “the colonists of Massachusetts Bay could, without changing a 
word, repurpose their company charter as a colonial constitution.”180 Thus, 
corporate law principles informed the American experience of constitutional 
governance.181 
Second, “the individuals who did most of the actual drafting were ‘im-
mersed in the conventions and usages of corporate law’ and drew on this back-
ground when framing the Constitution.”182 For example, James Wilson, whose 
task was to prepare drafts of the Constitution for the Committee of Detail, had 
handled the charters for several corporations and was familiar with the lan-
guage and structure of a corporate charter.183 His drafts of the Constitution “re-
veal that Wilson was preoccupied with the corporate status of the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Amar, supra note 164, at 1432–36 (explaining the “corporate analogy” that the Founders 
relied upon, which distinguished the limited government that they established from the plenary pow-
ers of the British Crown); Ciepley, supra note 15, at 426 (“[T]he framers began with a commitment to 
charter-limited government—something of which there is no trace in any recognized social contract 
theorist, but which descended, rather, from the tradition of chartering corporations.”). 
 177 See generally COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (Donald S. Lutz ed., 1998). 
 178 Ciepley, supra note 15, at 424. 
 179 Amar, supra note 164, at 1432–33. Mikhail, supra note 161, at 424 (“[M]any founding-era 
Americans were intimately acquainted with the history and charters of the colonies, cities, towns, 
guilds, churches, universities, trading companies, and other corporations which formed the basic gov-
erning units in their lives.”). 
 180 Ciepley, supra note 15, at 424 (citing EDMUND S. MORGAN, A PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STO-
RY OF JOHN WINTHROP 78–81 (Pearson 3d. ed. 2006) (1958)). 
 181 See id. (arguing that from corporate charters “grew the American and modern understanding 
of what a constitution is and what it does”). 
 182 Mikhail, supra note 161, at 424 (quoting Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 144, 
145 (2010)). 
 183 Id. at 424–25. 
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and considered the act of naming that corporate entity to be of great im-
portance.”184 During that era, the words “constitution” and “charter” were of-
ten used interchangeably, and several of the Founders referred to the U.S. Con-
stitution as a charter.185 
Finally, contemporaneous authorities recognized the United States as a 
corporation. For example, Chief Justice John Marshall declared that “‘[t]he 
United States of America’ is the true name of that grand corporation which the 
American people have formed, and the charter will, I trust, long remain in full 
force and vigour.”186 Accordingly, consistent with the Founders’ vision, the 
legal, moral, and political obligations of the United States are corporate in na-
ture and can be assessed without regard to the involvement of individual citi-
zens, past or present.187 
C. Distinguishing Voluntary Associations 
It may seem unnecessary to distinguish corporations from other types of 
businesses. After all, every form of business entity can hold property, enter 
contracts, and is subject to sanction for wrongdoing. Also, because a business 
entity has only a metaphysical existence as an attribute of legal rules rather 
than physical embodiment, the choices and conduct that form the basis for lia-
bility must be traceable to human beings.188 As long as those people are con-
nected to the business as agents, their actions will become the responsibility of 
the business. To this extent, collective liability works the same way regardless 
of the form of business organization. 
There are, however, important differences between the legal personhood 
of a corporation and the contingent, associational vitality of a partnership. Un-
fortunately, commentators using business law as an analogy for U.S. repara-
tions have not always marked the differences between these two forms of col-
lective organization, inadvertently weakening the case for reparations by de-
scribing the United States as a voluntary association. The concept of voluntary 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Id. at 425. 
 185 Id. at 426 (first quoting Constitution of the Bank of New York (1784), reprinted in 3 PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 514–18 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962); then quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 
339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); and then quoting George Washington, Pres. of the 
U.S., First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-
02-02-0130-0003 [https://perma.cc/UA5T-8Z32]). 
 186 Dixon v. United States, 7 F. Cas. 761, 763 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 3934). 
 187 Subject to the right of the people to convene for purposes of amending the Constitution, the 
authority vested in the three branches of government comes from the Constitution. Mikhail, supra 
note 161, at 433 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 188 According to the principle of “methodological individualism,” any collective activity should 
be reducible to the motivations of individual participants. PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND COR-
PORATE RESPONSIBILITY 2 (1984). 
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association, however, does not accurately represent the relationship of share-
holders to a corporation or citizens to their government.189 
1. The Impermanence of Partnerships 
Although corporations and partnerships both involve the coordination of 
individual capital and labor, they are otherwise distinct organizational choices. 
One is an artificial person, legally separate from its shareholders who play only 
a peripheral role; the other is a voluntary association subject to the will of each 
of its partners. Appreciating the differences between these two types of busi-
ness associations helps clarify why the U.S. obligation to pay reparations can 
be assessed without reference to the culpability (or lifespan) of individual U.S. 
citizens.190 
A partnership comparison may have appeal because individual partners in 
general partnerships are personally liable for the debts of the partnership,191 
but an argument for U.S. reparations cannot be built upon a partnership foun-
dation. First, voluntary association is a strained analogy for inherited citizen-
ship.192 Under the default rules, a partnership dissolution is triggered whenever 
a partner dies, leaves, or otherwise ceases to be involved in the carrying on of 
the partnership’s business. The partnership form is not designed for multi-
generational ownership. Second, partners are not directly liable for partnership 
debts before their association with a partnership. As the Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act puts it, “A person admitted as a partner into an existing partnership 
is not personally liable for any partnership obligation incurred before the per-
son’s admission as a partner.”193 Consequently, a partnership model of volun-
tary association reinforces the ethical-individualism objection to reparations 
for African Americans. 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Professors Posner and Vermeule observe that there is a difference between individual liability 
premised on voluntary association with a corporate entity and liability that is “incidental and deriva-
tive” of corporate liability. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704. They simply catalogue the 
distinction, however, without arguing which version, if either, is accurate. See id. 
 190 Limited liability companies fall somewhere in the middle. They resemble partnerships in most 
respects, but they appeal to investors because they combine the flexibility of the partnership with the 
investor protection of the corporate form. See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as 
Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 519 (noting that “new LLCs [are] being formed in the 
United States at twice the rate at which new corporations are being formed”). 
 191 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2013) (“Except as otherwise pro-
vided in subsections (b) and (c), all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the 
partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”). 
 192 See Gray, supra note 6, at 1078 (noting that for “states, racial groups, or ethnic groups[,] . . . 
membership is a matter of birth”). In a corporation, too, shares can be inherited. 
 193 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(b). 
832 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:799 
Unlike a general partnership, a corporation is permanent and operates ac-
cording to formal governance rules.194 When a corporation makes a decision, it 
does not simply seek to tally the preferences of its members; for most deci-
sions, a corporation’s board of directors has complete authority.195 Similarly, 
although citizens elect representatives, the authority invested in representatives 
is not defined by the will of the voters. In both cases, those who occupy offi-
cial offices are invested with authority to be exercised for the chartered pur-
poses of the entity itself. Only in an attenuated fashion does the legitimacy of 
corporate or government action depend upon shareholder or citizen consent.196 
A corporate theory of collective obligation differs from a voluntary asso-
ciation because it “holds that corporations and other corporate bodies can be 
considered persons for moral purposes.”197 The principle of ethical individual-
ism is satisfied, not because each shareholder has personal responsibility for 
corporate actions, but because the corporation is the individual whose respon-
sibility is at issue.198 It is true that “[s]hareholders, employees, and other mem-
bers are benefited or harmed as a consequence, but their claims are incidental 
and derivative.”199 If the corporation is the moral agent, it follows that share-
holders cannot object to liability “even if the current shareholders—the ones 
who must pay through devaluation of their shares—are different from the 
shareholders at the time the wrong was committed.”200 
2. Citizens United and Hobby Lobby 
Admittedly, there is a necessary caveat to our argument that corporations 
and partnerships are distinct and that the voluntary association concept pertains 
only to partnerships: the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment juris-
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 
377, 384 (1990) (observing that corporate law involves a combination of mandatory rules and contrac-
tual flexibility, and that is, “legal rules define the rights of directors and shareholders, thereby provid-
ing the boundaries within which private ordering can occur”). 
 195 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[T]he business and affairs of 
the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction . . . of the board of directors.”). 
 196 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 373, 377 (2018) (explaining that even where the board of directors ostensibly share 
power, as with the power to adopt and amend by-laws, the board of directors can often override share-
holder preferences). 
 197 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704. 
 198 Although it is beyond the scope of our present argument, we assume that there must be some 
ability for a shareholder (or citizen) to exit and to avoid future affiliation with a collective entity. A 
non-coercion principle along these lines, however, would not be tantamount to requiring a voluntary 
associational choice. 
 199 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 704. 
 200 Id. 
2021] A Corporate Law Rationale for Reparations 833 
prudence, including Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission201 and 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,202 has muddied the waters, suggesting 
that corporations can hold political and religious convictions because they are 
a mere conduit for the views of their owners. 
In 2014, in Justice Alito’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court in 
Hobby Lobby, he described the corporation using the language of voluntary 
association: 
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human be-
ings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies 
the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, of-
ficers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one 
way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are 
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these 
people.203 
It is hard to square this analysis with the concept of a corporation as a distinct 
legal person. From a purely doctrinal standpoint, one might defend the result in 
Hobby Lobby by pointing out that the narrow issue was whether the corpora-
tion was entitled to raise an objection under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA), which applies to “persons.” Although RFRA does not define the 
term “person,” the Dictionary Act contains a more general definition applica-
ble to federal statutes, which includes “corporations.”204 Also, whether it 
would be reasonable to find religious concerns applicable to larger, public cor-
porations, Hobby Lobby concerned “closely held corporations, each owned and 
controlled by members of a single family.”205 Thus, if viewed narrowly, the 
Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby was “clear and straightforward.”206 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 202 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 203 Id. at 706–07. 
 204 Id. at 707 (quoting Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 205 Id. at 717; see also Matthew I. Hall & Benjamin Means, The Prudential Third-Party Standing 
of Family-Owned Corporations, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 154 (2014), https://scholarship.law.
upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=penn_law_review_online [https://perma.cc/
MU3P-2HY8] (“As family-owned businesses, the corporations are ‘extension[s] of family relation-
ships,’ and there is every reason to expect that the corporations will serve as effective advocates for 
their owners.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values 
in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1194 (2013))). Thus, even if the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is correct, it may not apply to 
public corporations. The United States, a nation of over 300 million people, fits a public not private 
model of the corporation. 
 206 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 162 (2014). 
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Yet, the Supreme Court’s holding in an earlier case in 2010, Citizens 
United,207 cannot be explained away as a matter of statutory interpretation. In 
that decision, the Court overturned decades of election law jurisprudence and 
invalidated restrictions on a corporation’s use of its general treasury funds to 
promote political speech.208 The Court’s majority held that the First Amend-
ment precluded such restrictions. Several commentators assert that Citizens 
United “is grounded on the erroneous theory that corporations are ‘associations 
of citizens’ rather than what they actually are: independent legal entities that 
are conceptually distinct from those who own their stock.”209 Others have 
opined more broadly that the Court’s recent “decisions are the culmination of a 
decades-long attack on the reification of the corporation and an assault on the 
very notion of corporate interests separate from the narrowly defined interests 
of a company’s immediate owners.”210 
Whether or not the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning cor-
porate constitutional rights is defensible on the merits, however, it appears to 
be limited in scope. When the issue is corporate rights, “especially . . . relating 
to political rights, the justices have conceptualized the corporation not as a per-
son, akin to a natural human being, but as an association, akin to a voluntary 
membership group.”211 In the area of constitutional rights, the Court ignores 
corporate personhood to protect the interests of shareholders.212 Yet, in all oth-
er areas, the Court has been consistent in its recognition of the corporation as 
an independent legal person.213 
For example, diversity jurisdiction for corporations is based upon the lo-
cation of their principal place of business.214 By contrast, partnerships and lim-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Macey & Strine, supra note 190, at 453 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356); see Mar-
garet M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1742 (2015) (arguing for a pragmatic approach to assessing corporate 
rights based on underlying interests rather than grand theories). 
 210 June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 964 (2017). 
 211 Adam Winkler, Citizens United, Personhood, and the Corporation in Politics, in CORPORA-
TIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 359, 361 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017). 
 212 Id. (“If corporations are refused constitutional protection, the Court reasons, the individuals 
who associate together in the corporation are denied their rights.”). Put differently, “[c]orporations do 
not have rights because they are people. They have rights because they are associations of people.” Id. 
 213 See Macey, supra note 9, at 1199 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s existential theory of the corpora-
tion in constitutional rights cases is radically at odds with the existential theory of the corporation it 
adopts in every other area of the law.”). The lack of consistency may be troubling, but it remains the 
case that “in virtually all nonconstitutional cases involving corporations, the Supreme Court assumes 
that corporations are separate juridical entities.” Macey, supra note 9, at 1208; see Elizabeth Pollman, 
A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 32 (2014) (observing that the Supreme Court’s 
methodology is incoherent). 
 214 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010); Macey & Strine, supra note 190, at 488 
(“Treating the corporation as an association of shareholders is inconsistent with the well understood 
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ited liability companies are understood to be voluntary associations and their 
presence for purposes of diversity jurisdiction includes the places where their 
individual partners or members reside.215 The Court’s “view of diversity juris-
diction would not make sense if a corporation were an association of the peo-
ple who own and operate it.”216 Instead, for jurisdictional purposes, the corpo-
ration is recognized as a distinct person. 
The principle of double taxation in corporate tax further confirms that 
corporations are separate entities.217 As one commentator describes: 
Since Congress passed the federal income tax in 1909, corporations 
often have had to pay “double taxation” because the corporation 
pays taxes at the corporate level when it earns profits, and then its 
shareholders pay a second tax when profits are distributed as divi-
dends that are subject to the individual income tax.218 
The double-tax system would lack a rational basis if corporations were merely 
associations with no independent existence as legal persons.219 Notably, taxes 
work differently for partnership-type associations—the entity files an informa-
tional return and the individual owners pay a single tax.220 
Perhaps most pertinent for this Article’s argument, the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence concerning corporate criminal liability also proceeds on the assump-
tion that corporations are persons and therefore subject to criminal sanction for 
wrongdoing.221 If a corporation can violate the criminal law, and can be pun-
                                                                                                                           
legal rule that corporations are separate juridical entities in their own right for purposes of establishing 
jurisdiction for federal courts on the grounds of diversity of citizenship.”). 
 215 See 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3630.1, at 
223 (3d ed. 2009) (stating that “the Supreme Court has held that the state citizenship of all members 
of an unincorporated association will be taken into account in determining the association’s citizen-
ship when a question of diversity jurisdiction arises”). 
 216 Macey, supra note 9, at 1208 (observing that “if the Court truly embraced the associational 
view consistently across its corporate jurisprudence, then a corporation would be ‘present’ for purpos-
es of diversity jurisdiction in every state where its shareholders reside”). 
 217 See Macey & Strine, supra note 190, at 490 (“The corporate income tax reflects the view that 
a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its shareholders.”). 
 218 Macey, supra note 9, at 1209 (footnote omitted). 
 219 The Internal Revenue Code in Subchapter S recognizes a narrow exception for closely held 
corporations that resemble partnerships in their operations, but this only underscores the basic distinc-
tion between corporations and voluntary associations like partnerships. See I.R.C. § 1361; Macey, 
supra note 9, at 1209. 
 220 See Macey & Strine, supra note 190, at 490 (“In the world of business, as a general rule, jurid-
ical entities pay taxes and associations of investors do not.”). 
 221 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 499 (1909) (holding 
that a railroad corporation could be criminally responsible for violating a statute). The rationale for 
extending criminal law concepts from human beings to artificial, corporate persons was not well spec-
ified, see Blair & Pollman, supra note 209, at 1718, but the Supreme Court was clear that corporations 
are persons, not merely associations of investors. 
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ished for its transgression separate from the culpability of any of its agents, then 
it is a person in the eyes of the law.222 The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
concerning corporate constitutional rights may not be a model of clarity, but, 
viewed in full context, it does not seem to call into question the longstanding 
principle that corporations are legal persons distinct from their shareholders. 
D. Regime Change and Successor Liability 
Even if opponents of reparations were willing to concede that the United 
States shares with corporations the attribute of legal personhood, they might 
still invoke ethical individualism to argue that reparations should not be paid. 
That is, the ethical-individualism objection to reparations can be asserted at the 
level of the nation state.223 In international law, scholarship concerning transi-
tional justice seeks to ascertain whether a new regime should have legal or 
moral obligations to redress harms done by a predecessor regime.224 If the pas-
sage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments constituted a new “found-
ing moment,”225 then perhaps any claims for reparations today must be rele-
gated to the purview of transitional justice. For this reason, some scholars view 
efforts to recover payments from the current U.S. regime to account for the 
misdeeds of an earlier regime as problematic.226 
Although some contend that the United States cannot be held responsible 
for wrongdoing from an earlier era—that the United States is in some funda-
mental sense a different person—corporate jurisprudence regarding successor 
liability exposes the weakness of the argument. A corporation is a permanent 
entity and cannot shed its liabilities to creditors simply by amending its charter. 
When the United States extended citizenship rights to African Americans 
through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, it did not purport to dis-
solve the Union it had just spent blood and treasure to preserve. There has been 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See Macey, supra note 9, at 1210 (“Under the associational view of the corporation, it would 
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 224 See Gray, supra note 11, at 66 (“[T]ransitional regimes are defined in opposition to abuses 
perpetrated by their forebears. It is therefore hard to make the case that transitional and post-
transitional regimes are the same ‘person’ as the prior regime.” (footnote omitted)). 
 225 For a general analysis of how radical constitutional change can affect national continuity, see 
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 226 See Gray, supra note 6, at 1092 (arguing in favor of a special exception to ethical individual-
ism for reparations claims in the context of transitional justice). 
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no “event since the Founding that officially dissolved and reconstituted the 
American nation.”227 The United States is 244 years old. 
Moreover, regardless of whether it is possible to identify a U.S. entity dis-
tinct from the old pre-Civil War regime, corporate law rules of successor liabil-
ity provide that obligations cannot be shirked by transferring ownership across 
entities.228 In statutory mergers, all liabilities are assumed by the new entity 
automatically along with the target’s assets. Even when an acquirer uses an 
asset-purchase structure to pick and choose which liabilities to accept, the law 
protects third parties with existing claims by requiring that sufficient funds be 
reserved by the parties to handle the foreseeable claims of external creditors.229 
The claims African Americans could assert for their centuries of enslavement 
were readily apparent at the end of the Civil War. Accordingly, for reasons that 
corporate law makes plain, the United States should not be able to avoid its obli-
gations to African Americans, no matter when the obligations were incurred. 
Finally, even if one could characterize the post-Civil War changes as a 
“second founding” or locate such an event in the civil rights legislation of the 
1960s, or at any other point in our nation’s history, it would be discordant for 
the United States to rely on its newfound willingness to acknowledge the hu-
manity of African Americans as grounds for dismissing claims for justice as-
serted by African Americans for previous wrongdoing.230 By extending rights 
to former slaves and broadening the reach of equal protection, the United 
States did not purport to disclaim financial responsibility for having denied 
those citizenship rights previously. The extension of rights to African Ameri-
cans does not supply a reason for denying African Americans access to justice 
for wrongs done to them. 
III. CHARGING GUIDELINES FOR REPARATIONS 
So far, this Article has argued that the U.S. government shares much of its 
DNA with corporations and that the most important overlapping concept—
                                                                                                                           
 227 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 10, at 724 (“The most plausible candidate for such an event, the 
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 228 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 4 (2019) (“A corpora-
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favor of a more limited rule of successor liability. Id. 
 229 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981) (stating that “where 
one corporation acquires all or substantially all of the manufacturing assets of another corporation . . . 
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 230 See generally ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
STRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2017). 
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legal personhood—helps to neutralize the ethical-individualism objection to 
reparations. Whether or not citizens are personally responsible for slavery or 
Jim Crow laws is a distraction because the United States is the relevant actor, 
and the issue is whether the United States should pay reparations. 
This Part contends that corporate law also helps evaluate the strength of 
the substantive case for reparations.231 In particular, the DOJ’s Charging 
Guidelines, which the DOJ promulgated to guide the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in cases involving corporate crime, help focus the reparations dis-
cussion on key considerations. When applied to the question of reparations, the 
Charging Guidelines can be used to unpack the significance of our nation’s 
belated, partial, and often disingenuous response to its own history of en-
slavement and oppression of African Americans. 
A. Pervasiveness of Wrongdoing 
Under the DOJ’s Charging Guidelines, prosecutors are encouraged to 
consider how widespread wrongful actions were and whether senior manage-
ment was implicated: “[a]lthough acts of even low-level employees may result 
in criminal liability, a corporation is directed by its management and manage-
ment is responsible for a corporate culture in which criminal conduct is either 
discouraged or tacitly encouraged.”232 The harms that reparations would ad-
dress were not fleeting, nor were they the handiwork of rogue actors in the sys-
tem. To the contrary, “[f]or two hundred years, the federal government em-
braced policies that supported slavery and Jim Crow.”233 These wrongs were 
lasting and pervasive. 
The U.S. Constitution itself reinforced slavery in three specific clauses. 
First, it effectively endorsed the continuation of the slave trade, overturning the 
possible will of future majorities by prohibiting any restrictions on the impor-
tation of slaves until 1808.234 Second, the three-fifths compromise discounted 
the number of enslaved persons: “northerners had agreed to levy higher taxes 
on their own constituents to compensate southerners—who had the audacity to 
claim to be ‘principled agst. slavery’—for the ‘incumbrance’ of owning large 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See discussion infra Part III. 
 232 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 17, § 9-28.500(B). 
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numbers of human beings.”235 Third, the fugitive slave clause required that 
slaves who escaped into free states were to be “delivered up on Claim of the Par-
ty” who could assert ownership.236 In 1856, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that African Americans were categorically excluded from 
the Declaration of Independence’s statement that “all men are created equal.”237 
Some argue that “[i]t is hard to assign blame to the U.S. government, 
which is the institution that destroyed slavery at great cost.”238 Yet, even if the 
Civil War represented a principled stand against slavery, the United States was 
complicit in the institution of slavery from its founding.239 In the early years of 
the Republic, slave owners occupied many of the highest positions in govern-
ment, including the presidency.240 To do justice to the nation’s founding ideals, 
we should be willing to acknowledge the extent that the slaveholding founders 
fell short of the ideals they espoused.241 
The sheer scope of slavery in the United States could not have been 
achieved without support at all levels of government. To insist on assigning 
culpability only to individual actors is to understate the horror of what tran-
spired. In the wake of the Holocaust, lawyers seeking to devise mechanisms 
for bringing the perpetrators to justice confronted the gap between pervasive 
group conduct and the law’s focus on individual guilt or innocence. As one 
commentator explains, a “mass atrocity” has features that distinguish it from 
ordinary wrongdoing: 
Specifically, a bureaucratic state can organize such crimes with un-
precedented efficacy—employing sophisticated technologies, lasting 
several years, covering an entire country, perpetrated by many thou-
sands, victimizing millions—and harnessing the legal system to 
                                                                                                                           
 235 EINHORN, supra note 101, at 144–45. As Professor Robin Einhorn explains, “[T]he Constitu-
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these ends. Such wrongs are radically different from the garden-
variety crime in response to which standard legal doctrines were de-
veloped. These differences rise to a level that may not be merely nu-
merical, but categorical, requiring reassessment of the individualistic 
categories in which criminal law customarily thinks and judges.242 
Nor was racial oppression merely a regional phenomenon. For example, 
“Jim Crow laws mandating segregation in practically all spheres of life began 
in the North and West well before the Civil War.”243 Also, contrary to the view 
that the Civil War should be viewed as the payment of reparations for all that 
went before, the United States was not yet through with the business of racial 
oppression. After John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Lincoln, his suc-
cessor, Andrew Johnson, took steps to undermine racial equality and pro-
claimed “that America would remain a ‘white man’s government.’”244 Presi-
dent Johnson blocked the transfer of land to former slaves, leaving them with 
little means to accumulate wealth.245 This was by design.246 The law protected 
white supremacy.247 
B. Timely Acceptance of Responsibility 
In assessing a corporation’s level of culpability, federal prosecutors con-
sider whether a corporation has accepted full responsibility for the harms it has 
caused and put appropriate compliance mechanisms in place to avoid their re-
currence.248 Thus, the Charging Guidelines recognize that there is a difference 
between a single instance of wrongful behavior and a repeated pattern of mis-
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conduct: “[a] corporation, like a natural person, is expected to learn from its 
mistakes.”249 
Applied to the United States and its record on slavery, the analysis illumi-
nates the extent that the United States has failed to accept or learn from its his-
tory. To the contrary, the United States allowed Reconstruction to fail, cooper-
ated with the re-imposition of a brutal racial hierarchy in the South, and, more 
generally, failed to take responsibility for slavery, Jim Crow, and other forms 
of racial oppression. For example, Congress repeatedly refused to enact anti-
lynching legislation despite its awareness of “the stakes—thousands of human 
lives taken in brutally cruel and excruciatingly painful ways.”250 Congress’s 
inaction in the face of this evil was “culpable ignorance.”251 
Yet, critics of reparations maintain “that the American people, in some 
collective or corporate capacity, have already atoned for slavery on the fields 
of Antietam and Gettysburg.”252 Others have pointed to the civil rights legisla-
tion of the 1960s as a final reckoning with the nation’s history: “[t]he story was 
that the civil rights laws had permanently altered race relations in America, 
dividing history into a racist past and a color-blind present.”253 Unfortunately, 
this account ignores a “long history of injustice and its effects, which in fact 
had not abated in the least” and “pushed the burden of economic disparity 
squarely onto the black population.”254 Wishful thinking is not a meaningful 
substitute for acceptance of responsibility. 
Even when the law appeared to be on African Americans’ side, the courts 
denied them legal protection. In particular, the Supreme Court’s refusal to en-
force the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contributed to 
the end of the Reconstruction Era and left African Americans vulnerable to 
“Jim Crow[,] . . . the dead and heavy hand of slavery pushing down a new 
generation of blacks born free.”255 The most infamous of a series of U.S. Su-
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preme Court decisions was Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896,256 wherein the Su-
preme Court endorsed “separate but equal,” the equation used to justify “Jim 
Crow laws and segregation for half a century.”257 It is hard to claim that the 
Civil War settled all debts when the United States continued to oppress African 
Americans for a century afterward.258 
In 2009, Congress issued a resolution stating that “African-Americans 
continue to suffer from the consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws—long 
after both systems were formally abolished—through enormous damage and 
loss, both tangible and intangible, including the loss of human dignity and lib-
erty.”259 Not only was the resolution too late, but it was also too little, as it ex-
plicitly denied any responsibility for the harms it identified: “[n]othing in this 
resolution . . . authorizes or supports any claim against the United States.”260 In 
the same breath that it acknowledged the damage done to African Americans, 
Congress made clear that the United States was unwilling to accept any conse-
quences. 
It may be that the passage of time has rendered legal claims premised on 
the harms of slavery, Jim Crow, or other racial violence unsustainable.261 Some 
scholars claim that temporal concerns should also diminish the impetus for 
reparations as a practical matter.262 From a moral perspective, however, it is 
notable that local, state, and federal authorities have long refused to take full 
responsibility for harms imposed on African Americans.263 For example, after 
race riots near Tulsa, Oklahoma on May 3, 1921, killed hundreds of African 
Americans and left thousands homeless, the government blocked any remedy 
for the survivors: those who sought judicial recourse “were stymied by a judi-
cial system infected by the Ku Klux Klan and undermined by local and state 
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government that hid evidence and promised restitution that never came.”264 For 
eighty years, evidence showing the “government’s complicity in the riot” was 
kept hidden.265 
The “timely acceptance of responsibility” factor also helps address the 
objection that reparations for African Americans would create a slippery slope 
problem—no past wrong is ever too far removed to address.266 One answer is 
that, even when statutes of limitation apply, they may be equitably tolled—for 
example, “a continuing wrong does not start the clock running under a statute 
of limitation until the wrong culminates in an act of finality.”267 Thus, if the 
objection is raised that the harms complained of happened too far in the past to 
be actionable, and that it is not reasonable to ask societies to identify and re-
dress every wrong across the centuries of recorded history, the answer with 
respect to African Americans is that the United States never tried to repair the 
harm it had caused and so the harm never stopped.268 
The viability of legal reparations claims is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but it suffices for our purposes to show that the United States has long sought to 
minimize its record of slavery and racial oppression. For a prosecutor, a corpo-
rate defendant’s failure to take responsibility for its actions would support a de-
cision to bring charges. For the same reason, those weighing the merits of repa-
rations should conclude that the nation’s long delay in confronting the legacy of 
slavery is a reason to pay reparations, not a justification for shirking them. 
C. Restitution and Remediation 
In exercising their discretion regarding whether to bring charges, prosecu-
tors further consider whether the corporation has taken voluntary steps to fully 
compensate victims, thereby demonstrating its commitment to abide by the 
law.269 The United States benefited directly and indirectly from slavery,270 but 
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844 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:799 
it has never compensated African Americans for their enslavement and the cen-
tury of segregation and officially sanctioned discrimination that followed. No-
tably, “‘[f]orty acres and a mule,’ the reparation promised by General Sherman 
to former American slaves and codified by Section Four of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau Act, was not even paid.”271 Perhaps even more grotesque, in the imme-
diate aftermath of slavery, the United States paid reparations, not to former 
slaves but to slaveowners for loss of their property.272 
The Reconstruction Era offered a false promise of equality. The Thir-
teenth Amendment, which Congress ratified on December 6, 1865, declared 
that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”273 Three years later, 
the Fourteenth Amendment followed, guaranteeing that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”274 During the 
brief period that followed, African Americans registered to vote, served in state 
assemblies and Congress, and entered the legal profession.275 
Far from repairing the harm done over previous centuries of slavery, the 
short interval of Reconstruction was followed by the imposition of Jim Crow 
laws and other laws discriminating against African Americans. According to 
one commentator, “The failure of the nation to offer reparations to the freed 
slaves blighted their emancipation and demeaned the abuses they had suf-
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fered.”276 The federal government limited the ability of African Americans to 
build wealth. Through redlining, which rendered areas African Americans 
lived uninsurable, the government denied access to property ownership and 
wealth. Additionally, “New Deal programs that would have sent aid to build 
housing in the urban ghetto were instead used to create white suburbs that rein-
forced and perpetuated racial segregation for the rest of the century.”277 Thus, 
for African Americans, the New Deal served largely to further entrench white 
supremacy. 
A few commentators contend that more recent civil rights legislation, af-
firmative action programs, and even welfare are, in effect, reparations.278 For 
example, instead of being taxpayer funded, affirmative action’s cost is paid by 
“marginal candidates from nonpreferred groups.”279 Yet, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was justified, not by a theory of reparations for African Americans, but 
by the belief that discrimination harmed America by keeping talented people 
from contributing to the fullest of their abilities.280 The principal beneficiaries 
of the legislation have been white women.281 
Nor do modern day affirmative action programs qualify as reparations. 
The Supreme Court has rejected the rationale that affirmative action compen-
sates for disadvantages created by slavery and segregation and permits affirma-
tive action only in service of the nebulous notion of diversity, which, in theory, 
benefits white students and serves their interests.282 More generally, the 
Court’s strict colorblind approach to equality shows a refusal to accept respon-
sibility for how present-day inequalities of wealth and status were created and 
perpetuated. The only acceptable legal justification for affirmative action is 
forward-looking: the inclusion of diverse perspectives to create a superior edu-
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cational experience for all students.283 In any case, providing educational bene-
fits to a relatively small group of African Americans would leave many with-
out redress and would fail to benefit those who are most vulnerable.284 
D. Collateral Consequences 
The exposure of innocent people to collateral consequences is not a 
unique feature of corporate liability. For example, when parents are sent to jail, 
their children may suffer harm.285 The Charging Guidelines state that stake-
holder consequences do not affect the appropriateness of holding entities re-
sponsible for their actions.286 The Charging Guidelines, however, further pro-
vide that “[i]n the corporate context, prosecutors may take into account the 
possibly substantial consequences to a corporation’s employees, investors, 
pensioners, and customers, many of whom may . . . have played no role in the 
criminal conduct, have been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent 
it.”287 Accordingly, the Charging Guidelines recognize the possibility of excep-
tional cases in which individual members of the collective would be unfairly 
burdened. 
Corporate law contains instructive examples of what might qualify as an 
unfair burden. For example, if a corporation makes a fraudulent misstatement 
and investors purchase stock in reliance on that misstatement, the investors 
suffer twice: first, when the fraud is uncovered and the corporation’s stock 
price adjusts downward to reflect the undistorted value of the corporation’s 
assets, and, second, when the corporation’s assets are further reduced by what-
ever fine the government imposes.288 Meanwhile, those “who sold at inflated 
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prices” and have “bailed out prior to any judgment or settlement . . . will es-
cape without bearing any cost when liability is later imposed exclusively on 
their former corporation.”289 For this reason, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has announced a policy to avoid imposing punitive penalties on 
corporations “[w]here shareholders have been victimized by the violative con-
duct.”290 In that situation, policy considerations might dictate a reduced or 
waived fine because the financial penalty would be borne by those who were 
victimized by the original fraud. 
Taxpayers are more vulnerable than shareholders because they cannot di-
versify their risk.291 Applied to the question of reparations, however, it is plain 
that today’s citizenry would not be revictimized by reparations. U.S. citizens 
“are not themselves the primary victims of the offense.”292 To the contrary, 
Americans alive today benefit in the aggregate from wealth stolen from Afri-
can American slaves.293 Moreover, wealth inequality between racial groups can 
be traced to slavery and the de jure discrimination that followed. For example, 
disparities in school funding persist because local budgetary responsibility was 
designed to ensure that white people would not have to pay to educate black 
children.294 After emancipation, “[f]or blacks, the path toward wealth was 
closed by segregation, government policies, and economic reality.”295 As citi-
zens, we are all implicated by our membership in an entity enriched and dis-
torted by injustice.296 
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The existence of collateral consequences could be a relevant factor, how-
ever, when setting an upper bound for reparations. According to some calcula-
tions, the repayment of debt owed African Americans reaches into the trillions 
of dollars.297 If so, repayment in full would disrupt our nation’s economy and 
the lives of individual citizens. Corporate law does not provide a definitive 
answer but offers some context for thinking about this issue. For instance, 
when federal prosecutors charged the accounting firm Arthur Andersen with 
criminal violations in connection with its audit of Enron, the consequence was 
the destruction of the entire Arthur Andersen firm along with thousands of 
jobs.298 Although the government acted to deter accounting fraud, the scale of 
the resulting losses raises the concern that the prosecution did more harm than 
good.299 For similar reasons, reparations harsh enough to derail the nation’s 
economy might not be warranted, even if the calculation of the debt owed to 
African Americans was otherwise convincing. 
E. Availability of Individual Prosecution 
When federal prosecutors decide whether to charge a corporation with a 
criminal violation, they may also consider whether charging the individuals 
whose actions exposed the corporation to liability would better serve the public 
interest.300 Prosecution of those directly involved in wrongdoing avoids any 
concerns regarding the collateral losses suffered by other stakeholders and may 
provide a stronger level of deterrence. 
In the context of reparations, however, there is no viable alternative to 
U.S. reparations. None of the architects of slavery are alive to face repercus-
sions for their actions, and more than a half century has passed since the en-
actment of civil rights legislation. Also, even if slaveowners were still living, 
they could raise an argument familiar in the context of transitional justice ef-
forts: “that they relied on existing law, which told them that targeted abuses 
against a particular group were right, necessary, or at least not illegal.”301 Ac-
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cordingly, slaveowners would seek to “displace responsibility to the state or 
protest that imposing liability would violate prohibitions against ex post facto 
enforcement of law.”302 
If there were individuals available to punish, it might be sufficient to re-
spond that those who owned slaves knew or should have known the wrongful 
nature of their actions and ran the risk that they might later be held to ac-
count.303 Individual prosecutions, however, would not suffice to repair the 
harm because the full monstrousness of slavery is that the dehumanization of 
African Americans was lawful, built into our nation’s founding documents. 
Even after emancipation, “the federal government is morally accountable for 
its support of a deeply entrenched racial hierarchy and its failure to repair the 
consequences of slavery and Jim Crow.”304 A prosecutor using the Charging 
Guidelines would likely conclude that nothing short of entity responsibility 
would suffice to repair the harm caused. 
Moreover, practically speaking, an effort to force individual citizens to 
pay for reparations would target the descendants of original wrongdoers, 
thereby raising the ethical-individualism concern in its strongest form. We do 
not ordinarily visit the sins of parents on their children, let alone descendants 
separated by many generations. It remains possible, of course, for individuals 
to accept a duty to pay reparations based on their own family history. As one 
commentator explains, “with the internet revolution unveiling more family 
histories and efforts at a federal reparations movement stalled, there is a small 
but growing group of descendants of slave-owners conducting private efforts at 
atonement.”305 Those individual efforts can supplement, but they should not 
supplant a national accounting of the debt owed to African Americans. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, debate has intensified as to whether the United States 
should pay reparations to African Americans. According to proponents, justice 
requires no less.306 For centuries, African Americans provided unpaid labor for 
the benefit of others. The consequences of that injustice are still with us today. 
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No longer can slavery be excused with polite fictions about kindhearted slave-
owners or treated as an equation balanced by bloodshed and emancipation. 
And yet, the majority of Americans oppose reparations.307 If pressed to 
explain their position, many would echo then-Senate Majority Leader 
McConnell’s statement that there is no basis for reparations because “none of 
us currently living are responsible.”308 According to this view, the injustices of 
the past cannot be addressed because the individuals involved—the enslavers 
and the enslaved—are beyond the reach of earthly justice. This Article has 
used corporate law to demonstrate that the objection obscures the direct re-
sponsibility of the United States. 
Like a corporation, the United States is not just an aggregation of citizens, 
but a permanent entity capable of acting as a person on the world stage. Asser-
tions that individual citizens are innocent should be dismissed as irrelevant to 
the question of reparations. The United States was founded as a slave-owning 
nation, the United States built its economic might on the backs of those it en-
slaved, and it is the United States that must decide whether to confront its own 
history and to make amends for it. 
In closing, we cannot help but appreciate the irony of invoking corporate 
law to strengthen claims for justice lodged on behalf of the descendants of Af-
rican American slaves. In the wake of the Civil War, corporations used the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which Con-
gress enacted to protect newly freed slaves, to secure rights for themselves.309 
African Americans did not fully benefit from those constitutional protections 
for another century. It would be fitting, therefore, if corporate law provided the 
rationale necessary for reparations to win wider acceptance. 
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